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INTRODUCTION 
American Indian and Alaska Native women are under attack. The vio-
lence perpetuated against them has reached epidemic proportions. The sta-
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tistics are shocking. American Indian and Alaska Natives suffer from vio-
lence at a rate two and a half times greater than that of any other population 
in the United States. 1 According to the United States Department of Justice, 
one in three American Indian and Alaska Native women (Indian women) 
will be raped, 2 and six in ten will experience physical abuse in their life-
times. 3 Stalkers also target Indian women at a rate more than double that of 
any other population. 4 
Unlike other women in the United States, Indian women are more 
likely to experience interracial rather than intra-racial violence. 5 In fact, the 
per capita rate of interracial violence against Indian women greatly exceeds 
that of the general population.6 According to the U.S. Department of Justice 
(DOJ), non-Indian offenders commit 88% of all violence against Indian 
women. 7 Nearly four of five Indian victims of sexual assault identified the 
offender as white, 8 and three of four Indian victims of intimate-partner vio-
lence described the offender as of a different race. 9 
Even more problematic than these mind-boggling statistics is the legal 
reality in Indian country. 10 Federal law prohibits the governments of Indian 
I. See, e.g., U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-II-167R, U.S. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE DECLINATIONS OF INDIAN COUNTRY CRIMINAL MATTERS I (2010) 
[hereinafter GAO DECLINATION REPORT], available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d 11167r.pdf ("Specifically, from 1992 to 2001 American 
Indians experienced violent crimes at a rate of I OJ violent crimes per I ,000 persons annually, 
compared to the national rate of 41 violent crimes per 1,000 persons."); Violence Against 
Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of 2005, H.R. 3402, 109th Cong. § 
901 (2006); STEVEN W. PERRY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, AMERICAN INDIANS AND CRIME 7 
(2004), available at http://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/aic02.pdf. 
2. PATRICIA TJADEN & NANCY THOENNES, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FULL REPORT OF 
THE PREVALENCE, INCIDENCE, AND CONSEQUENCES OF VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: FINDINGS 
FROM THE NATIONAL VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN SURVEY 22 ex.7 (2000), available at 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles I /nij/183 781.pdf. 
3. /d. 
4. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND STALKING: THE SECOND 
ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS UNDER THE VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT II (1997), 
available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/ovw/166377.pdf; U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 
STALKING AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: THE THIRD ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS UNDER THE 
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT 8 ex.4 (1998), available at 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/ovw/172204.pdf. 
5. See, e.g., LAWRENCE A. GREENFIELD & STEVEN K. SMITH, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 
AMERICAN INDIANS AND CRIME 7 (1999), available at http://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdJlaic.pdf. 
6. See id. at 8. 
7. PERRY, supra note I, at 8. 
8. GREENFIELD & SMITH, supra note 5, at 7. 
9. !d. at 8 (noting that among American Indian victims, "75% of the intimate vic-
timizations and 25% of the family victimizations involved an offender of a different race," a 
much higher percentage than among victims of all races as a whole). 
I 0. Indian country is a legal tenn defined and used by the federal government to 
refer "to the territory set aside for the operation of special rules allocating governmental 
power[, including criminal jurisdiction,] among Indian tribes, the federal government, and 
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nations from prosecuting most non-Indian offenders-and only allows tribal 
governments to punish Indians for minor offenses. 11 In most communities in 
the United States, the local county or city government has the authority to 
investigate and prosecute both misdemeanor and felony crimes. 12 In Indian 
country, the local government is often the tribal government. However, fed-
eral legislation and case law have left tribal governments with far less legal 
authority to protect their citizens than any other local government. Re-
strictions placed on tribal governmental authority are a key factor creating 
and perpetuating the disproportionate violence against Indian women. They 
prevent Indian women from relying upon their tribal governments for safety 
or justice services and force them to seek recourse from foreign federal or 
state government agencies. 
Worse, the data available shows that more often than not Indian wom-
en do not receive justice from state and federal governments. Federal prose-
cutors regularly fail to prosecute violent crimes committed in Indian coun-
try. 13 According to a United States Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) Study, from 2005 through 2009, U.S. Attorneys failed to prosecute 
52% of all violent criminal matters referred to them for prosecution from 
Indian country, 14 including 67% of sexual abuse cases and 46% of assault 
cases. 15 State prosecutors, delegated with the authority to prosecute crimes 
the states." COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW§ 1.06, at 85-86 (Nell Jessup New-
ton et al. eds., 2012). Federal law statutorily defines Indian country as, 
all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the 
United States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and, includ-
ing rights-of-way running through the reservation[;] . . . all dependent Indian 
communities within the borders of the United States[;] ... [and) all Indian allot-
ments, the Indian titles to which have not been extinguished. 
18 U.S.C. § IISI(a)-(c) (2006). 
II. See, e.g., Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 208-09 ( 1978) 
(prohibiting tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians); 18 U.S.C. §§ 1152-1153 (extend-
ing federal jurisdiction over certain crimes in Indian country); 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (Supp. V 
2012) (limiting tribal sentencing authority). 
12. Kevin K. Washburn, American Indians, Crime, and the Law, 104 MICH. L. REV. 
709, 730-31 (2006). 
13. See, e.g., Mary Clare Jalonick, DOJ Will Not Provide Indian Crime Data, NEWS 
FROM INDIAN COUNTRY (Sept. 2008), http://www.indiancountrynews.com/index.php/news/9-
news-from-through-out -indian-country/4641-doj-wi 11-not -provide-indian-crime-data (report-
ing on a university study indicating that from 2004 to 2007 U.S. Attorneys failed to prose-
cute 50% ofreservation murders, 72% of child sex crimes, and 76% of adult rapes); REPORT 
TO CONGRESS: ANALYSIS OF PENALTIES FOR FEDERAL RAPE CASES 3 (1995) [hereinafter 
REPORT TO CONGRESS), available at 
http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative_and_Public_Affairs/Congressional_Testimony_and_Report 
s/Sex_Offense_Topics/199503_Federai_Rape_Cases.PDF (finding that only 97 of 42,013 
defendants sentenced under the federal sentencing guidelines in 1993 involved rape conduct). 
14. GAO DECLINATION REPORT, supra I, at2-3. 
15. !d. at 3. For a personal account of how U.S. Attorney's Offices handle Indian 
country crimes, see Kevin K. Washburn, American Indians, Crime and the Law: Five Years 
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in Indian country, also often fail to prosecute criminal cases occurring on 
Indian lands. 16 These numbers exceed comparable statistics for the prosecu-
tion of violent crimes against women in state courts. A 2008 Bureau of Jus-
tice Statistics Special Report indicates that state courts prosecuted 89% of 
domestic sexual assault defendants, 73% of non-domestic sexual assault 
defendants, and 66% of aggravated assault defendants. 17 
National attention has focused on violence against Indian women with 
the reauthorization of the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA). 18 In re-
sponse to the epidemic of violence against Indian women, Congress enacted 
and President Obama signed into law the VA W A Reauthorization Act on 
March 7, 2013. 19 The Act included a section restoring the inherent power of 
tribal governments to exercise special domestic violence criminal jurisdic-
tion over all persons committing specific intimate-partner related crimes in 
Indian country. 20 Some Republicans opposed the Senate bill because it 
would restore limited criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians to tribal gov-
ernments that are not bound by the United States Constitution. 21 They ins in-
of Scholarship on Criminal Justice in Indian Country 11-12 (Ariz. Legal Studies Discussion 
Paper No. 08-26, 2008), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=I287696 (describing how U.S. 
Attorney's Offices do not prioritize the prosecution oflndian country crimes). 
16. Carole Goldberg & Duane Champagne, Is Public Law 280 Fit for the Twenty-
First Century? Some Data at Last, 38 CONN. L. REV. 697, 697 (2006). 
17. ERICA L. SMITH, MATTHEW R. DUROSE & PATRICK A. LANGAN, U.S. DEP'T OF 
JUSTICE, STATE COURT PROCESSING OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CASES 2 (2008), available at 
http://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/scpdvc.pdf The main reason given for not prosecuting domes-
tic sexual and aggravated assault cases was because the victims would not cooperate. !d. The 
study also reported high rates of conviction: 98% for domestic sexual assault defendants and 
87% for non-domestic sexual assault defendants. !d. 
18. See, e.g., Tribes Make Push for Violence Against Women Act, FoxNEWS.COM 
(Mar. 7, 20 12), http://www. foxnews.corn/us/20 12/03/07 /tribes-make-push-for-violence-
against-women-act/; Sherry Hamby, Pass a Violence Against Women Act That Protects 
American Indian Women, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (July 30, 2012, 9:45 AM), 
http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/20 12/0730/Pass-a-Violence-Against-
Women-Act-that-protects-American-Indian-women. The Violence Against Women and 
Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of 2005 included an entire title devoted to ad-
dressing violence against Indian women. Pub. L. No. 109-162, § I, 119 Stat. 2960 (2006). 
Title IX, Safety for Native Women, provided for an annual consultation among Indian tribes 
(§ 903), analysis and research on violence against Indian women (§ 904), tracking of vio-
lence against Indian women (§ 905), grants to Indian tribal governments (§ 906), a tribal 
deputy in the Office on Violence Against Women (§ 907), and enhanced criminal penalties 
for firearm possessions by domestic violence perpetrators and habitual offenders (§§ 908-
909). 
19. Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, S. 47, I 13th Cong. 
(2013). 
20. !d. § 904. For a fuller description of the Violence Against Women Reauthoriza-
tion Act, see infra Part II. 
21. Caroline P. Mayhew, VA WA Tribal Provisions and Race Discrimination Argu-
ments, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY (May 29, 2012), 
http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/ict_sbc/vawa-tribal-provisions-and-race-
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uated that tribal governments would infringe on the human rights of non-
Indian criminal defendants. 22 Missing from this debate was any discussion 
about how federal restrictions on tribal criminal jurisdiction undermine the 
human rights of Indian women by denying them equal protection under the 
law, judicial protection, and an effective judicial remedy. 23 
The recent debates over the VA W A reauthorization demonstrate the 
critical importance of the concerns Professor Singel raises in her paper 
about the implications of tribal governments not taking human rights issues 
within their territories seriously. 24 Her paper rightly emphasizes the need for 
tribal governments to be accountable for and responsive to human rights 
violations in their territories. In her paper, she suggests how tribal govern-
ments can collaborate with one another to provide a system of external ac-
countability for human rights abuses committed by tribal governments. 25 
These issues are all very important, and the scant literature on tribal gov-
ernment accountability for human rights has frequently overlooked them. 
discrimination-arguments ("Following passage of the Senate bill, Senator Jon Kyl of Arizona 
released a statement claiming that 'by subjecting individuals to the criminal jurisdiction of a 
government from which they are excluded on account of race,' the tribal jurisdiction provi-
sion 'would quite plainly violate the Constitution's guarantees of Equal Protection and Due 
Process."'). 
22. See Letter from the Nat' I Ass'n of Criminal Def. Lawyers & the Nat' I Ass'n of 
Fed. Defenders, to Sen. Harry Reid, Majority Leader, Sen. Patrick Leahy, Chairman, Comm. 
on the Judiciary, Sen. Mitch McConnell, Minority Leader, and Sen. Charles Grassley, Rank-
ing Member, Comm. on the Judiciary, on the Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act 
of 2012 (S. 1925) (Apr. 23, 2012) [hereinafter Criminal Defense Letter], available at 
http://nacdl.org/WorkArea!DownloadAsset.aspx?id=24053 (arguing that enactment of the 
bill to reauthorize VA WA would deprive non-Indian defendants of basic constitutional rights 
with no effective remedy). 
23. See AMNESTY INT'L, MAZE OF INJUSTICE: THE FAILURE TO PROTECT INDIGENOUS 
WOMEN FROM SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN THE USA 28 (2006) [hereinafter MAZE OF INJUSTICE]; 
Women's Rights Are Human Rights: U.S. Ratification of the Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDA W): Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Human Rights & the Law of the Comm. on the Judiciary, Ill th Con g. (201 0) (written sub-
mission of the National Congress of American Indians Task Force on Violence Against 
Women and the Indian Law Resource Center). 
24. Wenona T. Singe!, Indian Tribes and Human Rights Accountability, 49 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 567, 568 (20 12). This is not to suggest that Indian nations have to ensure and 
respect human rights in the exact same manner as other governments. HENRY J. STEINER & 
PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: LAW, POLITICS, MORALS 366 
(2d ed. 2000) ("[M]any basic rights (such as the right to a fair criminal trial) allow for cultur-
ally influenced forms of implementation or realization (i.e., states are not r~quired to use the 
Anglo-American jury to assure fair a trial; states need not follow any one particular voting 
system to meet the requirement of a government that represents the will ofthe people)."). For 
a discussion of how international human rights law can be balanced with customary legal 
systems, see Robin Perry, Balancing Rights or Building Rights? Reconciling the Right to Use 
Customary Systems of Law with Competing Human Rights in Pursuit of Indigenous Sover-
eignty, 24 HARV. HUM. RTS.J. 71 (2011). 
25. Singe!, supra note 24, at 611. 
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This Article agrees that American Indian or tribal governments should 
be accountable for human rights in Indian country. 26 Human rights are the 
rights of individual persons based on their dignity as human beings. By ac-
countable, I mean that Indian governments should be held to the same 
standards of responsibility as other govemments27 under international law. 
Jurisdiction, however, is a precursor to governmental accountability for 
human rights, 28 and federal restrictions on tribal jurisdiction currently pre-
vent Indian nations from being accountable for human rights. 
Jurisdictional arrangements in Indian country complicate human rights 
accountability there. Yet the relationship between jurisdiction in Indian 
country and human rights accountability has received very little scholarly 
attention. 29 The few articles on tribal governments and human rights focus 
predominantly on issues of tribal sovereign immunity and the Indian Civil 
Rights Act. 3° Further, while a robust body of literature exists on the rights of 
indigenous peoples, it deals almost exclusively with the group rights of In-
dian nations to land and self-deterrnination.31 This Article seeks to close this 
gap in the literature by exploring fully the relationship between federal re-
strictions on tribal self-determination and the ability of Indian governments 
to respond to human rights violations, especially violence-based human 
rights violations. 
This Article shows how federal restrictions on tribal governments 
make tribal accountability for human rights violations based on private vio-
lence almost impossible. Private acts of violence, including but not limited 
to domestic violence, murder, and sexual abuse, undermine international 
26. /d. at 567-69. 
27. Many standards of governmental accountability for human rights come from 
international law and this Article uses international human rights law as a framework for 
understanding governmental accountability for human rights. 
28. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 2, ~I, adopted 
Dec. 19, 1966,999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR] (applying the ICCPR only to people 
subject to the State's jurisdiction). 
29. See, e.g., Angela R. Riley, Good (Native) Governance, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 
1049 (2007). 
30. See, e.g., Singe!, supra note 24, at 567-69; Greg Rubio, Reclaiming Indian Civil 
Rights: The Application of International Human Rights Law to Tribal Disenrollment Actions, 
11 OR. REV. INT'L L. I (2009). 
31. See, e.g., Bethany R. Berger, The Anomaly of Citizenship for Indigenous Rights, 
in HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES: BEYOND EXCEPTIONALISM 217 (Shareen Hertel & 
Kathryn Libal eds., 2011) ("The struggle for indigenous rights throughout history has not 
been only-or even primarily-to gain rights for native people as individuals separate from 
tribal communities, but to secure their right to self-determination as political entities distinct 
from states."); Robert T. Coulter, The U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: 
A Historic Change in International Law, 45 IDAHO L. REV. 539 (2009); Robert B. Porter, A 
Proposal to the Hanodaganyas to Decolonize Federal Indian Control Law, 31 U. MICH. J.L. 
REFORM 899 (1998). 
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human rights to life and security of the person. 32 As discussed in Section 
I.B, these private acts breach international human rights law, and govern-
ments incur responsibility for them when the government fails to take rea-
sonable measures to prevent or punish the injurious acts. 33 Indian govern-
ments cannot be accountable for human rights violations when federal law 
restricts their legal capacity to take reasonable measures to prevent and pun-
ish private acts of violence. 
This Article argues that restoring jurisdiction to Indian nations is a 
condition precedent for establishing a basis for tribal accountability for hu-
man rights. It agrees with proposals made by scholars, policymakers, and 
tribal advocates to restore to Indian nations the jurisdiction to prevent, pros-
ecute, and punish crimes that occur in Indian country. 34 It applauds the re-
cently enacted VA W A Reauthorization Act as a step towards restoring ju-
risdiction to Indian nations and increasing tribal accountability for human 
rights. 35 This Article illuminates the connection between such jurisdictional 
restorations and human rights accountability in Indian country. Because 
several recent articles have convincingly responded to the constitutional 
arguments for and against proposals to restore criminal jurisdiction to Indi-
an nations,36 this Article will only discuss the issue from the perspective of 
human rights accountability. 
32. See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. 
Doc. AIRES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR] ("Everyone has the right to life, 
liberty and the security of person."); ICCPR, supra note 28, art. 6 (right to life); American 
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, O.A.S. Official Rec., OENSer.L.N./11.23, doc. 
21 rev. 6 (1948) [hereinafter American Declaration], reprinted in Basic Documents Pertain-
ing to Human Rights in the Inter-American System, OENSer. L.VIII.82, doc. 6 rev. I, at 14 
(1992) (right to life, liberty and security of the person). 
33. See, e.g., Dinah Shelton, Private Violence, Public Wrongs, and the Responsibil-
ity of States, 13 FORDHAM lNT'L L.J. I, 15-24 (1990). 
34. See, e.g., Washburn, supra note 15, at 24 ("Federal policy should seek to restore 
tribal capacities for handling some or all of these functions."); MATTHEW L.M. FLETCHER, 
ADDRESSING THE EPIDEMIC OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN INDIAN COUNTRY BY RESTORING 
TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY 7-9 (2009), available at 
http://www.acslaw.org/sites/default/files/Fletcher"/o20Issue%20Brief.pdf. 
35. While the passage of the VA W A Reauthorization Act is laudable, real change in 
Indian country will depend on its implementation and the allocation of sufficient resources 
for its implementation. 
36. See, e.g., FLETCHER, supra note 34, at 7-9; Letter from Law Professors, to Sen. 
Patrick Leahy, Chairman, S. Judiciary Comm., Sen. Charles Grassley, Ranking Member, S. 
Judiciary Comm., Rep. Lamar Smith, Chairman, H. Judiciary Comm., and Rep. John Co-
nyers, Jr., Ranking Member, H. Judiciary Comm. on the Constitutionality of Tribal Govern-
ment Provisions in VA WA Authorization (Apr. 21, 2012) [hereinafter Law Professors Let-
ter], available at http://turtletalk.files.wordpress.com/20 12/04/vawa-letter-from-law-
professors-tribal-provisions.pdf; M. Brent Leonhard, Closing a Gap in Indian Country Jus-
tice: Oliphant, Lara, and the DOJ's Proposed Fix, 28 HARV. J. ON RACIAL & ETHNIC JusT. 
117(2012). 
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In arguing that restoring jurisdiction is a precursor to tribal govern-
ment accountability for human rights, this Article highlights the relationship 
between individual human rights and indigenous peoples', or group, rights. 
Indigenous peoples' rights are rights held by the indigenous people or 
groups of indigenous peoples. Foremost among indigenous peoples' rights 
is the right of self-determination. The right of self-determination empowers 
indigenous peoples, including Indian nations in the United States, to ensure 
and respect the individual human rights of their people. 37 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I uses international human 
rights law to show how federal restrictions on tribal authority undermine 
human rights accountability in Indian country. Section LA describes the 
current jurisdictional arrangement and its consequences, what I call the en-
forcement environment, in Indian country. Section I.B provides necessary 
background on international human rights law, including the obligations 
placed on governments to respect human rights and the circumstances under 
which governments are responsible for private violence under international 
human rights law. Then in Section I.C, I show how the enforcement envi-
ronment prevents tribal government accountability for human rights viola-
tions based on private violence in Indian country. Finally, I suggest that the 
United States cannot meet its obligations under international law as long as 
the current enforcement environment in Indian country remains in place. 
Part II argues that restoring jurisdiction to Indian nations is a condition 
precedent to tribal human rights accountability and may increase human 
rights accountability in Indian country. 
I. THE ENFORCEMENT ENVIRONMENT, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS ACCOUNTABILITY IN INDIAN COUNTRY 
This Part shows how federal restrictions on tribal authority undermine 
human rights accountability in Indian country. It starts by explaining the 
federal barriers to tribal criminal authority in Indian country in Section LA. 
This background on tribal criminal jurisdiction is essential to understanding 
the consequences of these barriers for human rights accountability in Indian 
country. Section I.B helps us to understand how the federal limits on tribal 
criminal authority complicate human rights accountability by summarizing 
the standards for government responsibility for private acts of violence un-
37. Robert T. Coulter, The Law of Self-Determination and the United Nations Dec-
laration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 15 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. I, 3 
(20 I 0) ("The right of self-determination was and still is centrally important to indigenous 
peoples, because it is essential to the preservation and well-being of indigenous cultures and 
societies and is necessary for the enjoyment of all other human rights."); PATRICK 
THORNBERRY, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND HUMAN RIGHTS 96 (2002) (explaining that universal 
realization of the right of self-determination "is a fundamental condition for the effective 
guarantee and observation of human rights"). 
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der international human rights law. Section I.C then explains how federal 
barriers to tribal criminal jurisdiction undermine human rights accountabil-
ity in Indian country. 
A. The Enforcement Environment in Indian Country 
The United States government has created complex jurisdictional rules 
that thwart the ability of tribal governments to exercise criminal jurisdiction 
in Indian country. 38 The United States government has always recognized 
Indian nations as separate governments with inherent sovereignty predating 
European arrival. 39 As part of their inherent sovereignty, Indian nations ex-
ercise authority over their land and people. 40 The United States, however, 
has unilaterally asserted the power to limit the governmental authority of 
Indian nations. 41 The federal government has exercised this authority to 
modify the powers of self-government that Indian nations inherently pos-
sess. 42 
The current legal structure governing criminal jurisdiction exemplifies 
how the federal government has greatly limited inherent tribal jurisdictional 
authority and replaced it with complex and confusing jurisdictional ar-
rangements in Indian country. 43 Criminal jurisdiction in Indian country is 
split among three governments: state, federal, and tribal. The authority to 
investigate and prosecute crimes that occur in Indian country depends on 
various factors, including the nature of the crime, the identity of the perpe-
trator, and the identity of the victim. These various factors complicate the 
analysis for determining which government has jurisdiction, and thus, is 
38. See supra note I 0 for a definition oflndian country. 
39. See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978) (stating that Indian 
tribes have long been recognized as sovereign entities "'possessing attributes of sovereignty 
over both their members and their territory"' (quoting United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 
544, 557 (1975))); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 580 (1832); Cherokee Nation v. 
Georgia, 30 U.S. I, 17 (1831 ). 
40. Sovereignty in the context of Indian nations in the United States differs signifi-
cantly from the sovereignty of states internationally. For a fuller discussion of these differ-
ences, see Coulter, supra note 37, at II. 
41. See, e.g., United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886); Lone Wolfv. Hitch-
cock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903). 
42. The United States has relied on the plenary power doctrine to, inter alia, divest 
Indian nations of criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians, Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 
435 U.S. 191, 208-09 (1978), reduce reservation boundaries without the Indian nation's 
consent or compensation, Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584, 594 ( 1977), abrogate 
treaties with Indian nations, United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371,423-24 
(1980), and divest tribal civil jurisdiction, Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 566 
(1981). 
43. MAZE OF INJUSTICE, supra note 23, at 27-28. 
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responsible for investigating and prosecuting the crime. 44 Consider, for ex-
ample, the multiple difficulties faced by the Indian woman, who, like the 
majority of Indian and Alaska Native women, has experienced sexual or 
physical violence.45 Simply to report the crime to the proper authorities, she 
must know whether the crime occurred in Indian country, whether the of-
fense is considered a major crime under federal law, and whether the perpe-
trator's status is Indian or non-Indian. If she calls the wrong authority, say 
the state instead of the tribal police, they may refuse to respond to the call 
and fail to refer her to the proper authorities. If she does not know whether 
she was in Indian country when the attack occurred or the Indian/non-Indian 
status of her attacker, she may not know to which authority-state, federal, 
or tribal-to report the crime. 46 
If the answers to these questions are determinable and not disputed, 
then jurisdiction depends on federal law.47 According to the United States 
Supreme Court in Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe, Indian nations have no 
criminal authority when the alleged offender is non-Indian.48 Only the fed-
eral government has jurisdiction if the alleged offender is non-Indian, 49 un-
less it has statutorily delegated such authority to a state (in which case, then 
only the state may have jurisdiction).50 Provisions recently enacted as part 
of the VA W A Reauthorization Act of 20 13 create one limited exception to 
the general rule that Indian nations have no criminal jurisdiction over non-
Indians. Section 904 of the Act restores to participating tribal governments 
authority over domestic violence, dating violence, and violations of protec-
tion orders when the defendant resides in the Indian country of the prosecut-
ing tribe, is employed by the prosecuting tribe, or is the spouse or estab-
44. /d. ("The end result can sometimes be so confusing that no one intervenes, leav-
ing victims without legal protection or redress and resulting in impunity for the perpetrators, 
especially non-Native offenders who commit crimes on tribal land."). 
45. See PERRY, supra note I, at 8; TJADEN & THOENNES, supra note 2. 
46. For a fuller discussion of enforcement problems related to land status, see MAZE 
OF INJUSTICE, supra note 23, at 33-34. 
47. For a fuller discussion of the federal laws governing criminal jurisdiction in 
Indian country, see Kevin K. Washburn, Federal Criminal Law and Tribal Self-
Determination, 84 N.C. L. REV. 779 (2006). 
48. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 208 (1978) (holding that 
tribal criminal authority over non-Indians was inconsistent with the tribes' status as domes-
tic, dependent nations). 
49. /d.§ 1152. 
50. The United States government has statutorily granted states criminal jurisdiction 
in Indian country on multiple occasions. See, e.g., id. § 1162. The most commonly referred to 
grant of such authority is PL-280, which authorized five (later six) states to assume criminal 
jurisdiction in Indian country. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 280, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588 
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (2006)). For a fuller discussion ofPL-280, see 
Carole E. Goldberg, Public Law 280: The Limits of State Jurisdiction Over Reservation 
Indians, 22 UCLA L. REv. 535 (1975). 
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lished intimate partner of a tribal member. 51 Participating tribal govern-
ments will not be able to prosecute crimes between two non-Indians or 
crimes occurring outside Indian country. 52 All criminal proceedings under § 
904 must provide the defendant with all rights required under the United 
States Constitution. 53 Indian nations and the DOJ are currently in the initial 
phases of implementing tribal jurisdiction over crimes of domestic vio-
lence. 54 Once they start exercising this special domestic violence jurisdic-
tion, Indian nations will have concurrent jurisdiction with the federal gov-
ernment, the state government, or both over a limited number of criminal 
offenses by non-Indians. 55 
A different rule prevails if the offender is Indian. Under federal law, 
Indian nations generally share criminal jurisdiction with the federal gov-
ernment when the alleged offender is Indian. 56 The Indian nation may have 
exclusive criminal jurisdiction if an Indian commits a misdemeanor against 
an Indian. 
As if these rules are not confusing enough, the Indian Civil Rights Act 
(ICRA) further complicates jurisdictional authority in Indian country by 
limiting the sentencing authority of tribal courts. Tribal courts may only 
sentence offenders to a maximum of one year imprisonment and/or a maxi-
mum fine of $5,000.00 unless the Indian nation has provided certain protec-
tions to the accused. 57 Once a tribal court provides these protections, it may 
sentence offenders to up to three years imprisonment and/or a maximum 
fine of $15,000.00 per offense with a total consecutive sentence of nine 
years for multiple offenses in a single criminal proceeding. 58 For tribal 
courts to exercise this enhanced sentencing authority, they must provide the 
defendant all of the following: (l) a right of effective assistance of counsel 
at least equal to that guaranteed by the United States Constitution; (2) li-
censed legal defense counsel at the expense of the tribe; (3) a presiding trib-
al judge that is licensed and law trained; (4) criminal laws, rules of evi-
dence, and rules of criminal procedure that are publicly available; and (5) an 
audio or video recording of the criminal trial. 59 A recent study by the GAO 
found that most tribal courts lack the funding and resources to implement 
51. Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, S. 47, !13th Cong. 
(2013). 
52. !d. 
53. !d. 
54. Pilot Project for Tribal Jurisdiction over Crimes of Domestic Violence, 78 Fed. 
Reg. 115, 35,961 (June 14, 2013) (announcing the creation of a pilot project to implement§ 
908(b)(2) of the VAWA Reauthorization Act of2013). 
55. !d. 
56. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1152-1153 (2006). 
57. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(7)(B), (c) (Supp. V 2012). 
58. !d.§ 1302(b)-(c). 
59. !d.§ 1302(c). 
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this enhanced sentencing authority. 60 In effect, the limitations on tribal sen-
tencing authority in ICRA make the federal government--or in cases of 
delegation, the state government-the only government with authority to 
prosecute felonies in Indian country. 61 
At first glance, these restrictions on tribal criminal jurisdiction may 
seem unproblematic from a strictly public-safety perspective. The Indian 
nation's lack of jurisdiction may not matter as long as the federal and state 
governments are exercising the authority claimed by (or delegated to) them. 
The problem is that the Oliphant decision did not place any responsibility 
on the United States government or the state governments to prosecute non-
Indian offenders on Indian lands. In the words of the United States Civil 
Rights Commission, "[T]he decision only dealt with limitations to tribal 
power, not the federal responsibility to compensate for those limitations 
based on the trust relationship. The Court did not require the federal gov-
ernment to protect tribes or prosecute non-Indian offenders who commit 
crimes on tribal lands."62 As a result, the federal government has devoted 
few resources to policing and prosecuting crimes in Indian country. The 
DOJ reports "that tribes have between 55 and 75 percent of the resources 
available to non-Indian communities."63 
Not surprisingly, prosecutions of violent crimes on Indian lands have 
historically been few and far between. The data available show that more 
often than not federal and state prosecutors fail to prosecute violent crimes 
committed on Indian lands. 64 The statistics merit repeating: According to a 
GAO Study, from 2005 through 2009, U.S. Attorneys failed to prosecute 
52% of all violent criminal matters referred to them for prosecution, includ-
60. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GA0-12-658R, TRIBAL LAW AND ORDER 
ACT: NONE OF THE SURVEYED TRIBES REPORTED EXERCISING THE NEW SENTENCING 
AUTHORITY, AND THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE COULD CLARIFY TRIBAL ELIGIBILITY FOR 
CERTAIN GRANT FUNDS 3 (2012) [hereinafter, GAO REPORT ON TLOA], available at 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/591213.pdf The report also emphasized that the Department 
of Justice needed to clarify tribal eligibility for certain grant funds so that tribal governments 
could apply for the resources they need to improve their legal systems. /d. at 3-4. It suggests 
a circularity in federal policy towards Indian governments, namely that policymakers refuse 
to fund adequately tribal governments and then use this lack of resources as a rationale for 
not restoring authority to them. 
61. Washburn, supra note 47, at 822 n.245. 
62. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, A QUIET CRISIS: FEDERAL FUNDING AND UNMET 
NEEDS IN INDIAN COUNTRY 68 (2003), available at 
http://www.prearesourcecenter.org/sites/default/files/library/aquietcrisis.pdf. 
63. /d. at 77; MAZE OF INJUSTICE, supra note 23, at 42. 
64. See, e.g., Jalonick, supra note 13 (reporting on a university study indicating that 
from 2004 to 2007 U.S. Attorneys failed to prosecute 50% of murder cases, 72% of child sex 
crimes, and 76% of adult rapes committed on Indian lands); REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra 
note 13 (finding that only 0.2% of 42,013 federal cases sentenced under the federal sentenc-
ing guidelines in 1993 involved rape conduct). For comparable data on state prosecutors, see 
generally Goldberg & Champagne, supra note 16; MAZE OF INJUSTICE, supra note 23, at 42. 
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ing 67% of sexual abuse cases and 46% of assault cases occurring on Indian 
lands. 65 The refusal of U.S. Attorneys to report declinations and share in-
formation on prosecutions with tribal governments (and victims) until fed-
eral law mandated they do so in 2010 compounded the problem of non-
prosecution in Indian country because tribal governments with concurrent 
jurisdiction were often discouraged from prosecuting the same crimes. 66 
Recently, some tribal governments have taken proactive approaches to their 
concurrent criminal jurisdiction, prosecuting all crimes within their jurisdic-
tion regardless of whether the federal or state government intended to pros-
ecute or not. 67 
B. Government Accountability for Private Acts of Violence Under Interna-
tional Law 
In this Section, I explain government accountability for private acts of 
violence under international human rights law. International human rights 
law provides us with a standard for understanding when governments are 
accountable for human rights violations. International human rights norms 
apply to the acts of subnational and national governments with the responsi-
bility of violations at the nationallevel. 68 While Indian nations may not be 
responsible for human rights violations under international law,69 these 
norms reflect growing international consensus on how governments should 
respect and ensure human rights. As such, they provide guidance to and can 
be used by tribal governments seeking to defend human rights and prevent 
65. GAO DECLINATION REPORT, supra note I, at 3. Various reasons have been given 
for the failure of the federal government to investigate and punish violent crimes in Indian 
country. Then U.S. Attorney for North Dakota Drew Wrigley asserted that lack of jurisdic-
tion and lack of evidence were the main reasons that U.S. Attorneys declined to prosecute 
cases. Examining Federal Declinations to Prosecute Crimes in Indian Country: Hearing 
Before the Comm. on Indian Affairs, I lOth Cong. 22-25 (2008) (statement of Hon. Drew H. 
Wrigley, U.S. Attorney, District of North Dakota). Former U.S. Attorney for the District of 
Minnesota Tom Heffelfinger explained that insufficient evidence is a problem due to juris-
dictional barriers, delays, remote locations of Indian tribes, and lack of resources, including 
police resources, crime laboratories, and sexual assault nurses. !d. at 37-39 (statement of 
Thomas B. Heffelfinger, Partner, Best and Flanagan, LLP). He also noted that U.S. Attorneys 
"work under difficult conditions with extremely large case loads." !d. at 37. Former assistant 
U.S. Attorney Kevin Washburn attributes poor prosecution rates in Indian country to the low 
priority given to Indian country cases. Washburn, supra note 12, at 718-19. 
66. Jalonick, supra note 13. 
67. It is difficult to discern whether tribes are more effectively and more frequently 
prosecuting crimes in Indian country because many tribal governments lack the resources to 
record such information. 
68. Risa E. Kaufman, State and Local Commissions as Sites for Domestic Human 
Rights Implementation, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES: BEYOND EXCEPTIONALISM, 
supra note 3 I, at 90 
69. Singe!, supra note 24, at 590. 
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human rights abuses in their territories. 7° Further, as the national govern-
ment, the United States could be responsible for human rights violations 
caused by private acts of violence due to the enforcement environment in 
Indian country. 71 
The protection of human rights is almost universally accepted as part 
ofthe domain ofinternationallaw. 72 International human rights law general-
ly consists of the rights in international human rights treaties and customary 
international law. 73 Human rights treaties usually recognize rights of indi-
viduals and impose obligations on state parties to ensure and respect those 
rights. 74 Ratification of a treaty binds the state to fulfill the legal obligations 
agreed to in its terms. 75 Multilateral treaties frequently codify existing inter-
national norms. 76 A state cannot avoid its obligations to abide by these 
70. As envisioned by the U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 
tribal governments should be held to the same standards as other governments. Declaration 
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples art. 34, G.A. Res. 61/295, Annex, U.N. Doc. 
NRES/61/295 (Sept. 13, 2007) [hereinafter U.N. Declaration] ("Indigenous peoples have the 
right to promote, develop and maintain their institutional structures and their distinctive 
customs, spirituality, traditions, procedures, practices and, in the cases where they exist, 
juridical systems or customs, in accordance with international human rights standards."). The 
International Law Association Committee on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples interprets 
Article 34 to include 
human rights guarantees under both customary international law and relevant trea-
ties ratified by the States concerned, provided that any limitations to the exercise of 
indigenous peoples' rights are consistent with Article 46(2) UNDRIP, i.e. that they 
are "non-discriminatory and strictly necessary solely for the purpose of securing 
due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and for meeting 
the just and most compelling requirements of a democratic society." 
Conference Report, Rights oflndigenous Peoples Comm., Int'l L. Ass'n, Sofia Conference 3 
(2012) [hereinafter ILA] (alteration in original) (quoting U.N. Declaration, supra, art. 46(2)), 
available at http://www.ila-hq.org/download.cfm/docid/227B560E-FOF5-4773-
BECC974CFC6AIIB8. 
71. This Article only considers the question of whether the United States govern-
ment could be found responsible under international law for private acts of violence in Indian 
country in the abstract. Full consideration of this issue is beyond the scope of this Article and 
would depend on the specific facts of the case involved and the international treaty implicat-
ed in that case. For this reason, I focus on the general standard of due diligence applied to 
private acts of violence under international law. 
72. See HUMAN RIGHTS: CONCEPTS, CONTESTS, CONTINGENCIES 2 (Austin Sarat & 
Thomas R. Keams eds., 2001). 
73. See id. at 96. 
74. See id. 
75. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 26, opened for signature May 23, 
1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 ("Pacta sunt servanda"); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
FOREIGN RELATIONS§ 321 (1987) ("Every international agreement in force is binding upon 
the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith."). In the United States, ratifica-
tion is an executive action that can include significant reservations to the treaty. See U.S. 
CONST. art. II, §§ 1-2; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS§ 314 & cmt. 
a. 
76. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 (7th ed. 2008). 
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norms by refusing to ratify multilateral treaties because these norms already 
exist as customary internationallaw. 77 Customary international law emerges 
from widely adopted, actual state practices. 78 Norms of customary interna-
tionallaw are formed through consistent and generalized state practice, per-
formed out of a sense of legal obligation. 79 States may be bound by custom-
ary international law as long as the practice is accepted as a legal obligation 
by widespread consensus, and the state has not persistently objected to the 
practice. 80 
Customary international law and treaties protect an expansive list of 
individual rights. These individual rights include, inter alia, life and security 
of the person, 81 non-discrimination, 82 access to justice, 83 and equal protec-
tion. 84 Recently, with the adoption of the United Nations Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Declaration), understandings of human rights 
have expanded to include the collective or group rights of indigenous peo-
ples as well as their individual rights. 85 The Declaration reaffirms that in-
digenous peoples as individuals and groups have all human rights and fun-
damental freedoms under international human rights law. 86 For example, it 
77. Chubb & Son, Inc. v. Asiana Airlines, 214 F.3d 301,308 (2d Cir. 2000). 
78. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 102(2); BROWNLIE, supra 
note 76, at 6-10. 
79. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS§ 102(2); BROWNLIE, supra note 
76,at6-IO. 
80. But see Roach v. United States, Case 9647, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No. 
3/87, OEA/Ser.L.N/11.71, doc. 9 rev.~ 54 (1986-1987) (explaining that a state's persistent 
objections cannot overcome a peremptory norm of international law). 
81. See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 28, art. 6 (right to life). 
82. See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 28, art. 26 (equal protection under the law); Inter-
national Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, opened for 
signature Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 [hereinafter ICERD]. 
83. See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 28, art. 2(3) (effective remedy); id. art. 26 (equal 
protection under the law); id. art. 14 (equality before the courts); ICERD, supra note 82, art. 
5(a) (equal treatment in the administration of justice); id. art. 6 (effective protection and 
remedies). 
84. See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 28, art. 2(3) (effective remedy); id. art. 26 (equal 
protection under the law); id. art. 14 (equality before the courts); ICERD, supra note 82, art. 
5(a) (equal treatment in the administration of justice); id. art. 6 (effective protection and 
remedies). 
85. Coulter, supra note 31, at 547. The United Nations General Assembly voted 143 
to 4 in support of the Declaration. Press Release, General Assembly, General Assembly 
Adopts Declaration on Rights of Indigenous Peoples; "Major Step Forward" Towards Hu-
man Rights for All, Says President, U.N. Press Release GA/10612 (Sept. 13, 2007), available 
at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2007/ga I 0612.doc.htm. The four states that voted 
against the Declaration-the United States, Canada, New Zealand, and Australia-have all 
since endorsed it. !d.; Gale Courey Toensing, UN Declaration's One-Year Anniversary: 
"Much to Celebrate, Much More to Be Done," INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY (Dec. 12, 2011), 
http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/article/un-declaration%25e2%2580%2599s-
one-year-ann iversary-much-to-ce lebrate-much-more-to-be-done-661 08. 
86. U.N. Declaration, supra note 70, art. I. 
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recognizes the collective rights of indigenous peoples to, among other 
things, self-determination, 87 traditional indigenous property rights and sys-
tems of property law, 88 honoring of treaty rights, 89 and conservation of the 
environment. 90 The Declaration also affirms specific rights of indigenous 
individuals, including rights to life, physical and mental integrity, liberty 
and security of the person,91 freedom from forced assimilation or destruction 
of their culture,92 ability to belong to an indigenous community/nation,93 
freedom from violence against women and children,94 education rights,95 
labor rights,96 and mental and physical health rights. 97 
International human rights treaties place positive obligations on states 
and attempt to hold them legally responsible for breaches of these obliga-
tions. "Generally, human rights treaties establish the obligation to respect all 
the rights they recognize in favor of all individuals" under the state's juris-
diction. 98 Thus, the United States is bound to respect the rights in treaties it 
has ratified, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR) and the International Convention on the Elimination of All 
!d. 
87. See, e.g., id. arts. 3, 4, 34. 
88. !d. art. 26. Article 26 states, 
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to the lands, territories and resources which 
they have traditionally owned, occupied or otherwise used or acquired. 
2. Indigenous peoples have the right to own, use, develop and control the lands, 
territories and resources that they possess by reason of traditional ownership or 
other traditional occupation or use, as well as those which they have otherwise 
acquired. 
3. States shall give legal recognition and protection to these lands, territories and 
resources. Such recognition shall be conducted with due respect to the customs, 
traditions and land tenure systems of the indigenous peoples concerned. 
89. !d. art. 37 ("Indigenous peoples have the right to the recognition, observance and 
enforcement of treaties, agreements and other constructive arrangements concluded with 
States or their successors and to have States honour and respect such treaties, agreements and 
other constructive agreements."). 
90. !d. art. 29 ("Indigenous peoples have the right to the conservation and protection 
of the environment and the productive capacity of their lands or territories and resources. 
States shall establish and implement assistance programmes for indigenous peoples for such 
conservation and protection, without discrimination."). 
91. !d. art. 7(1). 
92. !d. art. 8. 
93. !d. art. 9. 
94. !d. art. 22. 
95. !d. art. 14(2). 
96. !d. art. 1 7. 
97. !d. art. 24(2). 
98. Leonardo A. Crippa, Multilateral Development Banks and Human Rights Re-
sponsibility, 25 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 531, 545 (2010). 
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Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD).99 Federal or national govern-
ments answer internationally for human rights violations even when they 
have delegated implementation to a subnational or local government. 100 
Even though Indian nations are inherent sovereign governments and not 
subnational governments, more likely than not, the United States govern-
ment must answer internationally for breaches of human rights treaties in 
Indian country 101 because as domestic, dependent nations, Indian nations 
cannot enter into international human rights treaties. 102 
Governments can be responsible for their inaction, or failure to protect 
human rights, as well as their infringements on human rights. 103 In some 
situations, treaty-based international human rights organizations have held 
governments responsible for their failure to protect individuals from human 
rights violations perpetrated by private actors. 104 In this respect, internation-
99. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted Dec. 19, 1966, 
S. Treaty Doc. No. 95-20 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR Senate Document]; 
ICERD, supra note 82. 
I 00. Kaufman, supra note 68, at 89-90 ("As Louis Henkin noted, international law 
allows the federal government to leave implementation of human rights treaty provisions to 
the states, although the United States remains internationally responsible for a state's failure 
to implement a treaty obligation .... "). 
I 0 I. International human rights bodies have criticized the United States government 
for human rights issues in Indian country. See, e.g., Comm. on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination, Concluding Observations: United States of America, 72d Sess., Feb. 18-Mar. 
7, 2008, ~ 26, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/USNC0/6 (May 8, 2008). 
102. See, e.g., Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 518 (1832); Cherokee Nation v. 
Georgia, 30 U.S. I, 17 (1831 ). 
I 03. Shelton, supra note 33, at I 7 ("International practice has long made clear that 
both acts and omissions may give rise to international liability, depending on the duty im-
posed under international law."). 
104. See, e.g., Velasquez-Rodriguez v. Honduras, Merits, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. 
H.R. (ser. C) No.4, ,1~ 147, 182, 185 (July 29, 1988) (holding Honduras responsible for 
Velasquez-Rodriguez's disappearance and death when the actual parties responsible were 
unknown but suspected to be military personnel); Lenahan v. United States, Case 12.626, 
Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No. 80/1 I, OENSer.L.NIII.142, doc. II,~~ 2, 199 (2011) 
(finding that local law enforcements failure to prevent domestic violence by enforcing a valid 
protection order constituted discrimination and denied women equal protection and judicial 
protection); Osman v. United Kingdom, 1998-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. at iii, iv, 48 (stating that the 
state bears responsibility if authorities knew or ought to have known that criminal acts of a 
third party posed a real and immediate risk to the life of an identified individual and the 
authorities failed to take reasonable measures to avoid that risk); Rep. of the Comm. on the 
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 32d Sess., Jan. 10-Jan. 28, 2005, Views of 
the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women Under Article 7, Para-
graph 3, of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Dis-
crimination Against Women, ~~ 9.3-.4, U.N. Doc. N60/38, Annex III; GAOR, 60th Sess., 
Supp. No. 38 (2005) [hereinafter Article 7 Report] (finding Hungary violated a woman's 
right to security of the person by failing to prevent ongoing violence against her by her for-
mer common law husband). 
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al human rights law places more obligations on the United States to respect 
human rights than does domestic constitutional law in the United States. 105 
Several human rights treaties impose obligations on states to prevent, 
investigate, and punish acts committed by private actors. 106 For example, 
Article 2(1) of the ICCPR states that each state party "undertakes to respect 
and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdic-
tion the rights recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction of 
any kind." 107 The Human Rights Committee (HRC) has interpreted Article 
2(1) as obligating states to protect individuals from private acts that violate 
Covenant rights. 108 While its views are not definitive, the HRC's interpreta-
tion suggests that a state's failure to take appropriate measures to prevent, 
punish, investigate, or redress the harm caused by a private act could lead to 
a violation of the ICCPR because the state did not respect and ensure human 
rights. 109 Similarly, under Article 5(b) of the ICERD, state parties undertake 
to guarantee the right of everyone in the enjoyment of"[t]he right to securi-
ty of person and protection by the State against violence or bodily harm, 
whether inflicted by government officials or by any individual, group or 
institution." 110 Other human rights treaties signed but not ratified by the 
United States, including the United Nations Convention on the Elimination 
105. See, e.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 
191, 195 (1989); Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 750-51, 760 (2005). For a 
fuller discussion of this point, see Shelton, supra note 33, at 26-34. 
106. ICCPR, supra note 28, art. 2(1); Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women art. 2, opened for signature Mar. I, 1980, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 
[hereinafter CEDA W]; ICERD, supra note 82, art. 2. 
I 07. ICCPR, supra note 28, art. 2(1 ). 
108. Human Rights Comm., The Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on 
States Parties to the Covenant,~ 8, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.I/Add.13 (May 26, 2004) 
("However the positive obligations on States Parties to ensure Covenant rights will only be 
fully discharged if individuals are protected by the State, not just against violations of Cove-
nant rights by its agents, but also against acts committed by private persons .... "). 
109. /d. The Human Rights Committee has also interpreted Article 7 as imposing 
obligations on state parties to prevent private acts. Office of the High Comm'r for Human 
Rights, Human Rights Comm., Article 7 (Prohibition of Torture, or Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment),~ 2, U.N. Doc. HRIIGEN/1/Rev.9 (Vol. I) (Mar. 10, 
1992) ("The aim of the provisions of article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights is to protect both the dignity and the physical and mental integrity of the 
individual. It is the duty of the State party to afford everyone protection through legislative 
and other measures as may be necessary against the acts prohibited by article 7, whether 
inflicted by people acting in their official capacity, outside their official capacity or in a 
private capacity."). 
110. ICERD, supra note 82, art. 5(b); see also id. art. 2 ("Each State Party undertakes 
not to sponsor, defend or support racial discrimination by any persons or organizations ... 
[and] shall prohibit and bring to an end, by all appropriate means, including legislation as 
required by circumstances, racial discrimination by any persons, group or organization."). 
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of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) 111 and the Inter-
American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of 
Violence Against Women, 112 also obligate states to prevent violence com-
mitted by private actors. 
These treaties do not hold states responsible for every private act of 
violence committed within their territory. States are only responsible for 
private acts of violence when it is "possible to attribute to the state some 
conduct with respect to the [private violence] that implies the non-
performance of an international duty." 113 A breach of international law by a 
state requires '"conduct consisting of an action or omission [that]: (a) is 
attributable to the State under international law; and (b) constitutes a breach 
of an international obligation of the State."' 114 
Treaty-based international and regional human rights organizations, 
including the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Dis-
crimination (CERD Committee), the European Court on Human Rights, and 
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, have interpreted these 
human rights treaties and customary law as requiring states to act with due 
diligence when responding to private acts of violence. 115 Due diligence 
places a duty on states to exercise due care. 116 This "duty encompasses an 
obligation to marshal the full apparatus of the state to prevent, investigate, 
punish and compensate." 117 
Ill. CEDA W, supra note 106, art. 2; accord Rep. of the Comm. on the Elimination 
of Discrimination Against Women, lith Sess., Violence Against Women, ~ 9, U.N. Doc. 
A/47/38; GAOR, 47th Sess., Supp. No. 38 (I 993) (explaining that states may be responsible 
for private acts of violence "if they fail to act with due diligence to prevent violations of 
rights or to investigate and punish acts of violence"). 
112. Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of 
Violence Against Women art. 7, June 9, 1994,33 I.L.M. 1534. 
113. Shelton, supra note 33, at 21. 
114. Robert P. Bamidge, Jr., The Due Diligence Principle Under International Law, 
8 INT'L COMMUNITY L. REv. 81, 89 (preprint 2006) (alteration in original) (quoting Rep. of 
the Int'l Law Comm'n, 53d Sess., Apr. 23-June I, July 2-Aug. 10, 2001, Draft Articles on 
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, art. 2, U.N. Doc. A/56/I 0; GAOR, 
56th Sess., Supp. No. 10 (2001), reprinted in JAMES CRAWFORD, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW 
COMMISSION'S ARTICLES ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY: INTRODUCTION, TEXT AND 
COMMENTARIES 61 (2002)), available at 
http://academia.edu/430200/The _Due_ Diligence _principle_ Under _International_ Law. 
115. See, e.g., Velasquez-Rodriguez v. Honduras, Merits, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. 
H.R. (ser. C) No. 4, ~ 172 (July 29, 1988); Osman v. United Kingdom, 1998-VIII Eur. Ct. 
H.R. at 32-33; Article 7 Report, supra note 104, ~ 9.2. The use of due diligence by treaty-
based human rights organization is an extension of the concept with regard to the protection 
of aliens. Shelton, supra note 33, at 21-22. 
116. Stephanie Farrior, State Responsibility for Human Rights Abuses by Non-State 
Actors, 92 AM. Soc'y INT'L L. PROC. 299,302 (1998). 
117. !d. 
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Under the due diligence standard, a state is not responsible for purely 
private harm but is liable if '"it displayed, in the conduct of its organs or 
officials, patent or manifest negligence in taking the measures which are 
normally taken in the particular circumstances to prevent or punish the inju-
rious acts.'" 118 In other words, "[d]ue diligence consists of the reasonable 
measures of prevention that a well-administered government could be ex-
pected to exercise under similar circumstances." 119 While the government is 
not liable for the initial harm, it "cannot ignore a wrong even where it has 
no initial responsibility." 120 A state cannot delegate its due diligence obliga-
tions even in situations where another state or a non-state actor performs 
certain functions. 121 
As the Inter-American Court of Human Rights explained in its land-
mark decision holding the Honduran government responsible for the disap-
pearance of Manfredo Velasquez: 
An illegal act which violates human rights and which is initially not directly im-
putable to a State (for example, because it is the act of a private person or because 
the person responsible has not been identified) can lead to international responsi-
bility of the State, not because of the act itself, but because of the lack of due dili-
gence to prevent the violation or to respond to it .... 122 
Even though the Velasquez case involved state action that was diffi-
cult to prove, rather than non-state action, some treaty-based human rights 
organizations, including the European Court of Human Rights and the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights, have interpreted its language 
broadly to apply the due diligence standard to human rights violations by 
private actors. 123 These organizations have found the state liable internation-
ally for private acts of violence when the state's failure to act with due dili-
118. Shelton, supra note 33, at 23 (quoting F.V. GARCiA-AMADOR, LOUIS B. SOHN & 
R.R. BAXTER, RECENT CODIFICATION OF THE LAW OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURIES TO 
ALIENS 27 (1974)). 
119. !d.; see also Dorothy Q. Thomas & Michele E. Beasley, Domestic Violence as a 
Human Rights Issue, 58 ALB. L. REv. 1119, 1124-25 (1995) (discussing a state's failure to 
prosecute as making it complicit in the human rights violation). 
120. Shelton, supra note 33, at 24. 
121. Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, Its Causes and Consequences, 
The Due Diligence Standard as a Too/for the Elimination of Violence Against Women,~ 34, 
Comm'n on Human Rights, Econ. & Soc. Council, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/61 (Jan. 20, 
2006) [hereinafter UNSRVAW Report] (by Yakin Ertiirk). 
122. Velasquez-Rodriguez v. Honduras, Merits, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. 
C) No. 4, ~~ 172, 182 (July 29, 1988). 
123. See, e.g., id. ~ 2, 182; Osman v. United Kingdom, 1998-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. at 32-
33; Article 7 Report, supra note 104, ~ 9.2. The use of due diligence by a treaty-based human 
rights organization is an extension of the concept with regard to the protection of aliens. 
Shelton, supra note 33, at 21-22. 
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gence undermines the rights contained in a human rights instrument. 124 They 
have found states "responsible under a due diligence standard for inaction or 
inadequate action in a range of situations, including failure to provide police 
protection to prevent private violence, failure to investigate or to investigate 
adequately killings by private individuals, and failure to punish adequately 
or punish at all." 125 
In the context of private acts of violence, treaty-based organizations 
have interpreted due diligence to require that governments take actions to 
prevent future crimes, to investigate crimes that have been committed, to 
prosecute perpetrators fairly, and to make reparations to victims. 126 While 
the application of the due diligence standard is case specific, treaty-based 
organizations have provided some guidance on what states have to do to 
prevent and investigate private acts of violence with due diligence. The duty 
to prevent does not obligate the state to prevent all human rights abuses, but 
to "promote the protection of human rights and ensure that any violations 
are considered and treated as illegal acts, which, as such, may lead to the 
punishment of those responsible and the obligation to indemnify the victims 
for damages." 127 The duty to investigate means that states should seriously 
investigate human rights violations so that private persons or groups are not 
allowed to act freely and with impunity to the detriment of human rights. 128 
124. Osman v. United Kingdom, 1998-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. at 32-33, 45; Article 7 
Report, supra note I 04, ~~ 9.2-.3, .6; cf Thomas & Beasley, supra note 119, at 1134. 
125. See Farrior, supra note 116, at 302. 
126. See Christina Misner-Pollard, Domestic Violence in Russia: Is Current Law 
Meeting the Needs of Victims and the Obligations of Human Rights Instruments, 3 CoLUM. J. 
E. EuR. L. 145, 174 (2009) (citing U.N. Div. for the Advancement of Women in Collabora-
tion with U.N. Office on Drugs & Crime, Rep. of the Expert Group Meeting, May 17-May 
20, 2005, Good Practices in Combating and Eliminating Violence Against Women 4 (2005), 
available at http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/egrnlvaw-gp-
2005/docs/FINALREPORT.goodpractices.pdf); see also UNSRV AW Report, supra note 
121, at~~ 26-27; Velasquez-Rodriguez, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4, ~ 174 ("The State 
has a legal duty to take reasonable steps to prevent human rights violations and to use the 
means at its disposal to carry out a serious investigation of violations committed within its 
jurisdiction, to identify those responsible, to impose the appropriate punishment and to en-
sure the victim adequate compensation."); Lenahan v. United States, Case 12.626, Inter-Am. 
Comm'n H.R., Report No. 80/11, OEA/Ser.L.N/11.142, doc. II ~ 126 (2011) 
("[I]ntemational bodies have consistently established that a State may incur international 
responsibility for failing to act with due diligence to prevent, investigate, sanction, and offer 
reparations for acts of violence against women; a duty which may apply to actions committed 
by private actors in certain circumstances."). 
127. Velasquez-Rodriguez, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No.4,~ 175. 
128. !d. ~ 176 ("The State is obligated to investigate every situation involving a viola-
tion of the rights protected by the Convention. If the State apparatus acts in such a way that 
the violation goes unpunished and the victim's full enjoyment of such rights is not restored 
as soon as possible, the State has failed to comply with its duty to ensure the tree and full 
exercise of those rights to the persons within its jurisdiction."); id. ~ 177 ("Where the acts of 
private parties that violate the Convention are not seriously investigated, those parties are 
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In cases of domestic violence, these organizations have found that due dili-
gence requires the state to take reasonable actions to protect women and 
children from violence when the state knew or should have known they 
were in "a situation of risk." 129 
Treaty-based organizations have used the due diligence standard to re-
quire states to take affirmative action to prevent, investigate, and punish 
private acts of violence. Due diligence provides a standard by which to 
measure the performance of governments in responding to human rights 
abuses caused by private acts of violence. States may be liable for human 
rights violations when they fail to investigate crimes adequately, punish 
perpetrators, and make reparations to victims. 
C. Federal Barriers to Tribal Criminal Authority Undermine Human Rights 
Accountability 
This Section demonstrates how, based on the due diligence standard 
for government accountability under international human rights law, the 
enforcement environment in Indian country impedes human rights account-
ability because tribal governments lack the authority to prevent, investigate, 
and punish private acts of violence, and the only governments with the au-
thority to prevent, investigate, and punish these acts do not do so. Private 
acts of violence that occur in Indian country are not regularly investigated 
or punished, leading to human rights violations, in Indian country, especial-
ly against women. 130 My analysis suggests that the current enforcement en-
vironment compounds rather than alleviates human rights violations occur-
ring in Indian country. As a result, the enforcement environment prevents 
Indian nations from acting as human rights defenders and exposes the Unit-
aided in a sense by the government, thereby making the State responsible on the international 
plane."); Lenahan, Case 12.626, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No. 80/11, ~ 178. 
129. See Lenahan, Case 12.626, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No. 80/11, ~ 133. 
In the context of violence against women, some scholars describe the due diligence standard 
as requiring the state to prevent the systematic, discriminatory enforcement of criminal laws. 
See, e.g., Misner-Pollard, supra note 126, at 174; Thomas & Beasley, supra note 119, at 
1124-25. 
130. I use violence against women as an example for two reasons: first, the debate 
over restoring tribal criminal authority has focused on this context; and second, an important 
segment of the international community has recognized violence against women as a human 
rights violation in similar situations. See, e.g., Fernandes v. Brazil, Case 12.051, Inter-Am. 
Comm'n H.R., Report No. 54/01, OEA/Ser.L.N/11.111, doc. 20 rev.~~ 2, 44 (2000) (finding 
that Brazil had violated the petitioner's right to justice under Article 25 of the American 
Convention on Human Rights because it had failed to investigate properly and prosecute 
Maria da Penha Maia Fernandes' husband after he tried to kill her and left her paralyzed); 
Lenahan, Case 12.626, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No. 80/11, ~ 150. 
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ed States government to potential legal responsibility for private acts of 
violence occurring in Indian country. 131 
The enforcement environment undermines the human rights accounta-
bility of Indian nations for violence-based human rights in Indian country 
because it greatly restricts the ability of tribal governments to prevent, in-
vestigate, or punish most private acts of violence. While most routine vio-
lent crimes are not necessarily human rights abuses, the failure of the state 
to prevent, punish, or investigate private acts of violence can lead to breach-
es of international human rights obligations. 132 For example, failure to inves-
tigate and punish private acts of violence may lead to the violation of the 
victim's rights to life, equal protection, or a judicial remedy under the 
ICCPR, the ICERD, or the American Declaration. 133 
Without the power to prevent, investigate, or punish most violent 
crimes, Indian nations cannot exercise due diligence to ensure and respect 
human rights as required by international human rights law. Consider, for 
example, the experience of an Indian woman raped by a non-Indian in Indi-
an country. As if her rape is not traumatic enough, she probably has no legal 
recourse against her attacker from her Indian nation unless her attacker was 
her intimate partner and her Indian nation has met the requirements for spe-
cial domestic violence jurisdiction under VA W A. Further, the United States 
or the state government will most likely refuse to investigate and punish the 
rapist. 134 This scenario is all too common in Indian country. It demonstrates 
how the enforcement environment, which largely prevents the Indian nation 
from acting and allows the federal and state governments to respond inade-
quately to the private act of violence, leads to the violation of the women's 
rights to equal protection under the law and an effective judicial remedy, in 
addition to the violation of her right to be free from violence. Further, the 
tribal government cannot act with due diligence in response to the private 
act of violence because it is severely limited in its ability to prevent subse-
131. Increasingly, regional and international human rights bodies have held govern-
ments responsible for similar failures to prevent and punish violence-based human rights 
abuses. See, e.g., Fernandes, Case 12.051, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No. 54/0 I, rev.~ 
44; Lenahan, Case 12.626, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No. 80/11, ~ 170; Opuz v. Tur-
key, App. No. 33401/02, 2009-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 38 (2009), 
http:/ /hudoc.echr .coe. inti sites/eng/pages/search.aspx ?i=OO 1-92945# {"full text": ["Opuz v. 
Turkey"],"itemid":["OO 1-92945"]}. 
132. See supra Section I. B. 
133. See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 28, art. 2(3) (stating that each state party has an 
obligation to ensure effective remedies to victims of human rights violations); id. art. 14 
(equality before the courts); id. art. 26 (equal protection under the law); ICERD, supra note 
82, art. 5(a) (equality before the law and equal treatment before tribunals); id. art. 6 (right to 
effective protection and remedies); American Declaration, supra note 32, art. II (equal pro-
tection before the law); id. art. XVIII (right to effective judicial recourse). 
134. See supra Section I.A. 
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quent attacks or human rights abuses due to its lack of criminal authority. 135 
As a result, tribal governments cannot act with due diligence to ensure indi-
viduals' rights to life or provide them with access to justice or an effective 
remedy because they lack the jurisdiction to investigate and punish the non-
Indian perpetrator. 136 Even when Indian nations have criminal authority, as 
in the cases involving two Indians, federal law restricts their ability to pre-
vent and punish these crimes by limiting their sentencing authority. 137 Thus, 
the Indian nation may not be able to act with due diligence even when the 
private act of violence is committed by an Indian. 
The difficulty in applying the rules governing criminal authority in In-
dian country poses additional problems for Indian governments trying to 
respond to private acts of violence with due diligence. The multiple re-
quirements for determining which governmental authority has jurisdiction 
undermine the ability of victims to report crime. 138 These barriers to report-
ing often discourage women from reporting such crimes, making it even 
more difficult for tribal governments to prevent, investigate, and punish 
private acts of violence. As a result, victims of private acts of violence in 
Indian country are regularly denied access to justice and an effective judi-
cial remedy. Rather than promote human rights, federal restrictions on tribal 
criminal authority make it almost impossible for Indian nations to exercise 
due diligence in preventing, investigating, and punishing private acts of 
violence in Indian country. 
The United States' abysmal record of preventing, investigating, and 
punishing private acts of violence in Indian country may make it legally 
responsible for violations of human rights instruments there. The United 
States has signed and ratified several human rights treaties, including the 
ICCPR and ICERD, which obligate it to act with due diligence in response 
135. Tribes may, and many have, turned to civil law as a way of trying to prevent 
violence against women. For example, tribal courts may grant protection orders against non-
Indians. See, e.g., SHELBY SETTLES HARPER & CHRISTINA MARIE ENTREKIN, OFFICE ON 
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN & THE NATIONAL CENTER ON FULL FAITH AND CREDIT, VIOLENCE 
AGAINST NATIVE WOMEN: A GUIDE FOR PRACTITIONER ACTION 13-14 (2006). 
136. The right to life is often described as the most fundamental of all individual 
human rights. See, e.g., Case of the "Street Children" v. Guatemala, Merits, Judgment, Inter-
Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 63, ~ 144 (Nov. 19, 1999) (stating that the full exercise of the right 
to life is essential for the exercise of all other human rights). International human rights 
bodies have consistently interpreted the right to life as including the guarantee to be free 
from violence. See, e.g., Rep. of the Corum. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against 
Women, lith Sess., General Recommendation 19: Violence Against Women,~~ 7-8, U.N. 
Doc. N47/38; GAOR, 47th Sess., Supp. No. 38 (1993); cf G.A. Res. 581147, ~ 5, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/58/147 (Feb. 19, 2004). 
137. See supra Section I.A. 
138. For a list of these requirements, see supra Section I.A. 
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to private violence. 139 As described in Section LA, the United States gov-
ernment frequently fails to respond or responds inadequately to private acts 
of violence in Indian country. It may not be fulfilling its duty to prevent, 
investigate, and punish private violence in Indian country. For example, 
because the federal government rarely prosecutes crimes in Indian country, 
non-Indian perpetrators routinely are not punished. This pattern of non-
punishment undermines the prevention of future human rights abuses. It 
creates a climate conducive to further human rights violations "since society 
sees no evidence of willingness by the State, as the representative of the 
society, to take effective action to sanction such acts." 140 In reality, it often 
translates into impunity for non-Indian perpetrators, who are then free to 
target Indians in Indian country and commit even greater atrocities. 141 This 
failure of the United States to investigate, prosecute, and punish private acts 
of violence may suggest its complicity in the perpetuation of these private 
acts in Indian country and its responsibility for these acts based on this 
complicity. 142 
Further, the United States' failure to act with due diligence may lead 
to violations of other rights recognized by these human rights instruments, 
including the victims' rights to life and equal protection under the law. 143 
The failure of federal and state governments to punish violent offenders in 
Indian country undermines the survivor's rights to life and security of the 
person by subjecting her-especially the domestic violence survivor, who 
has an ongoing relationship with the perpetrator-to the constant threat of, 
or an actual ongoing, escalating cycle of violence. 144 Even survivors who do 
not know their attacker are at risk because if the attacker approaches her 
139. See ICCPR Senate Document, supra note 99; International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, S. 
Treaty Doc. No. 95-18 (1978), 660 U.N.T.S. 195; see also notes 98-110 and accompanying 
text. 
140. See Fernandes v. Brazil, Case 12.051, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No. 
54/01, OENSer.L.NIII.III, doc. 20 rev.~ 56 (2000). 
141. Some non-Indian perpetrators seem to be aware of the restrictions on tribal 
criminal authority and target Indian country specifically because they believe (often correct-
ly) they can get away with criminal activities there. See, e.g., MAZE OF INJUSTICE, supra note 
23, at 30 ("Reportedly, the apparent gap in jurisdiction or enforcement has encouraged non-
Indian individuals to pursue criminal activities of various kinds in Indian Country."); id. at 
61 ("[T]he failure to prosecute sex crimes against American Indian women is an invitation to 
prey with impunity."). 
142. As described in Section I.B, under the due diligence principle, governments can 
be held accountable for their systematic failure to prevent and punish human rights violations 
perpetrated by individuals within their territory. See supra Section I. B. 
143. See supra note 133 and accompanying text. 
144. Donald G. Dutton, et al., Arrest and the Reduction of Repeat Wife Assault, in 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: THE CHANGING CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESPONSE Ill, 111-16 (Buzawa & 
Buzawa eds., 1992) (noting that domestic abusers are often repeat offenders and that police 
intervention reduces recidivism in identified populations of wife abusers). 
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again, the tribal government may not be able to prevent another attack, and 
the state or federal government may not respond at all. 145 
Some evidence already suggests that the United States may be in vio-
lation of the human rights of Indian women by failing to protect them from 
the epidemic of violence occurring in Indian country. International human 
rights bodies have criticized the United States government for its failure to 
fulfill its due diligence obligations to Indian women. In 2008, the CERD 
Committee found the United States government had violated Indian wom-
en's rights to security of the person (Article 5(b)) and effective protection 
and remedies (Article 6) under the ICERD. 146 In its Concluding Observa-
tions and Report, the Committee stated, 
The Committee also notes with concern that the alleged insufficient will of federal 
and state authorities to take action with regard to such violence and abuse often de-
prives victims belonging to racial, ethnic and national minorities, and in particular 
Native American women, of their right to access to justice and the right to obtain 
adequate reparation or satisfaction for damages suffered. (Articles 5(b) and 6). 147 
Other international human rights experts have recently demonstrated 
an acute interest in learning more about the epidemic of violence against 
women in Indian country. During her 2011 country visit to the United 
States, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women 
visited the Eastern Band of Cherokee in North Carolina to investigate how 
federal laws diminish tribal authority to protect Indian women and as a re-
sult, deny Indian women meaningful access to justice and prevent them 
from living free from violence. 148 In October 2011, the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights held a special hearing to investigate the 
145. Tribal law enforcement officers are typically the first responders to crimes in 
Indian country. The likelihood that federal law enforcement would be able to respond quick-
ly is low since most federal law enforcement is not located in--or sometimes even near-
Indian country (unless, of course, the Indian nation has cross-deputized officers). For a fuller 
discussion of the problems of prosecution of Indian country crimes by the federal govern-
ment, see Washburn, supra note 12, at 710-12. 
146. Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Consideration of Reps. 
Submitted by State Parties Under Art. 9 of the Convention, 72d Sess., Feb. 18-Mar. 7, 2008, 
Concluding Observations of the Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination: United 
States of America,~ 26, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/USNC0/6 (Feb. 2008). 
147. /d. 
148. Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, Its Causes and Consequences, 
Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, Its Causes and Consequences,~ 
66, Human Rights Council, 17th Sess., U.N. Doc. AIHRC/17/26/Add.S (June 1, 2011) (by 
Rashida Manjoo). The U.N. Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Racism and the 
U.N. Special Rapporteur on Indigenous Peoples also learned about this issue on recent visits 
to the United States. INDIAN LAW RESOURCE CENTER: JUSTICE FOR INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, Safe 
Women, Strong Nations, http://indianlaw.org/safewomen (last visited July 11, 2013) (men-
tioning advocacy before the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Racism). 
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same issues. 149 These investigations by international human rights bodies 
indicate that due to the current enforcement environment, the United States 
may not be meeting its due diligence obligations towards Indian women 
under international human rights law. 
Recent decisions by the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights (Commission) also suggest that the United States could incur legal 
responsibility under international human rights law for private acts of vio-
lence in Indian country. In Lenahan v. United States, the Commission found 
that the United States had failed to exercise due diligence to respect and 
ensure the human rights guaranteed to a mother and her three minor daugh-
ters under the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man. 150 
Jessica Lenahan had secured a valid protection order against her former 
husband, Simon Gonzales, after he had exhibited erratic and abusive behav-
ior towards her and their three minor daughters. 151 Lenahan noticed her 
daughters were missing one evening and suspected her ex-husband had ab-
ducted them, even though the restraining order only allowed very limited, 
pre-arranged visitation between them. 152 She repeatedly contacted local law 
enforcement, begging them to find her daughters and enforce the protection 
order. 153 Local law enforcement continually dismissed her concerns and 
only reluctantly filed a missing persons report several hours after she had 
initially contacted them. 154 Early the next morning, the police killed Gonza-
les in a shootout and found Lenahan's young daughters' bodies in Gonza-
les's truck. 155 
In Lenahan, the Commission found that the United States' failure to 
act with due diligence to prevent domestic violence constituted discrimina-
tion and denied women equal protection and judicial protection. 156 It held 
that "the United States violated Jessica's right to judicial protection when it 
did not enforce the restraining order and when it failed to adequately inves-
149. INDIAN LAW RESOURCE CENTER: JUSTICE FOR INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, Violence 
Against Native Women Gains Global Attention, http://indianlaw.org/safewomen/thematic-
hearing-video-Oct25-2011 (last visited Oct. 8, 2013) (providing detailed information and 
testimony at thematic hearing on violence against Native Women in the United States before 
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights on Oct. 25, 2011). 
150. Lenahan v. United States, Case 12.626, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No. 
80111, OENSer.L.N/II.l42, doc. II~ 5 (2011). 
151. !d. ~ 66. 
152. !d. ~ 24. 
153. !d. ~ 71 (finding that "Lenahan had eight contacts" with local police the night 
her daughters disappeared). 
154. !d.~~ 72, 79. 
155. !d. ~ 81. 
156. !d. ~ 125 ("The international community has consistently referenced the due 
diligence standard as a way of understanding what State's human rights obligations mean in 
practice when it comes to violence perpetrated against women of varying ages and in differ-
ent contexts, including domestic violence."). 
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tigate and provide access to information about the deaths of Jessica's chil-
dren."157 The Commission explained that Lenahan's restraining order sig-
naled both state knowledge of a risk of harm and the need for state protec-
tion.158 This judicial recognition of risk and the corresponding need for pro-
tection obligated the state "to ensure that its apparatus responded effectively 
and in a coordinated fashion to enforce the terms of this order to protect the 
victims from harm." 159 Once Lenahan made law enforcement aware of the 
restraining order, at a minimum, local law enforcement should have thor-
oughly read the order to determine its applicability and whether it had been 
violated, verified the existence of the order if the holder did not have a 
copy, and attempted to locate and arrest the abuser. 160 In contrast, the Com-
mission described the response of local law enforcement to Lenahan's re-
quests "as fragmented, uncoordinated and unprepared; consisting of actions 
that did not produce a thorough determination of whether the terms of the 
restraining order at issue had been violated." 161 The Lenahan case suggests 
that the United States may also be held responsible internationally for viola-
tions of Indian women's rights in a case where the United States was aware 
of the risk of violence to an Indian woman but failed to exercise due dili-
gence to prevent it. 
II. PROMOTING HUMAN RIGHTS ACCOUNTABILITY IN INDIAN COUNTRY 
Central to the proposition that governments should be held accounta-
ble for human rights violations is the notion that governments can be held 
accountable and that they have the jurisdiction to prevent and punish human 
rights violations. As Part I shows, this proposition does not hold for Indian 
nations when it comes to certain human rights abuses. For Indian nations to 
157. Max D. Siegel, Surviving Castle Rock: The Human Rights of Domestic Violence, 
18 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 727, 732 (2012) (citing Lenahan, Case 12.626, Inter-Am. 
Comm'n H.R., Report No. 80/11, ~~ 177, 180, 194, 199 (2011)). 
158. Lenahan, Case 12.626, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No. 80111, ~ 142 (stat-
ing "that the issuance of a restraining order signals a State's recognition of risk that the bene-
ficiaries would suffer harm from domestic violence on the part of the restrained party, and 
need State protection"). 
159. /d.~ 145. 
160. /d. ~ 147 (explaining that under the due diligence standard, local law enforce-
ment "would have reasonably been expected to thoroughly review the terms of the order to 
understand the risk involved, and their obligations towards this risk. According to the re-
quirements of the order itself, the CRPD should have promptly investigated whether its terms 
had been violated. If in the presence of probable cause of a violation, they should have ar-
rested or sought a warrant for the arrest of Simon Gonzales as the order itself directed. This 
would have been part of a coordinated protection approach by the State, involving the actions 
of its justice and law enforcement authorities"). 
161. /d.~ 150. 
Jurisdiction and Human Rights Accountability 383 
be accountable, however, they first need to have the jurisdiction to ensure 
and respect individual human rights. 
Removing the current limitations on tribal criminal authority would 
enhance the accountability of both Indian nations and the federal govern-
ment for human rights violations based on private acts of violence in Indian 
country. 162 Numerous scholars, 163 policy-makers, 164 practitioners, 165 and trib-
al advocates 166 have recommended that the United States remove the current 
limitations on tribal criminal authority. Removing barriers on tribal criminal 
jurisdiction could involve restoring felony jurisdiction over Indians 167 and 
tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians 168 to Indian nations. Both pro-
posals merit serious consideration 169 and could extend to all Indian nations, 
including those affected by federal statutes delegating criminal authority to 
state governments. 170 
Most recent proposals, scholarly and otherwise, advocate for allowing 
tribal governments to opt in or choose whether they want to exercise ex-
panded criminal jurisdiction. 171 The opt-in approach does not require all 
162. In focusing on the legal barriers to human rights accountability in Indian coun-
try, I do not mean to suggest that removing these alone will cure all the problems related to 
violence in Indian country. Solving the problem of violence in Indian country, admittedly, 
will also require proactive and preventative approaches to providing shelters and advocacy 
services for victims, re-educating abusers, treating underlying personal issues, such as drug 
or alcohol abuse, and much, much more. This proposal is merely an important piece of a 
larger effort to heal Indian communities so the violence will end. 
163. See, e.g., Washburn, supra note 15, at 24 ("Federal policy should seek to restore 
tribal capacities for handling some or all of these functions."); FLETCHER, supra note 34, at 7-
9. 
164. Most recently, versions of the Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 
2012, S. 1925, !12th Cong. (2012), and the Stand Against Violence and Empower (SAVE) 
Native Women Act, S. 1763, !12th Cong. (2011), have included proposals for limited resto-
rations to Indian nations of criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians. 
165. Examining the Prevalence of and Solutions to Stopping Violence Against Indian 
Women: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, I lOth Cong. 41-62 (2007) (state-
ment ofRiyaz A. Kanji, Kanji & Katzen). 
166. Joseph P. Kalt & Joseph William Singer, Myths and Realities of Tribal Sover-
eignty: The Law and Economics of Indian Self-Rule 14 (KSG Faculty Research Working 
Paper Series, Working Paper No. RWP04-016, 2004), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=529084 (stating that Indian nations "repeatedly strive now to over-
tum [the] distinctions" between Indian and non-Indian for criminal purposes). 
167. See Washburn, supra note 47, at 848-49. 
168. FLETCHER, supra note 34, at 7-9. 
169. See, e.g., Washburn, supra note 15, at 24 ("Federal policy should seek to restore 
tribal capacities for handling some or all of these functions."); FLETCHER, supra note 34, at 7-
9. 
170. See, e.g., Goldberg & Champagne, supra note 16, at 725 (suggesting need to 
reconsider Pub. L. No. 280 and allow greater retrocession on a tribe-by-tribe basis). 
171. FLETCHER, supra note 34, at 8; Gideon M. Hart, A Crisis in Indian Country: An 
Analysis of the Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, 23 REGENT U. L. REV. 139, 183-84 
(2010); Samuel E. Ennis, Comment, Reaffirming Indian Tribal Court Criminal Jurisdiction 
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tribal governments to accept expanded jurisdiction. 172 It also responds to the 
reality of scarce resources in Indian country and the probability that not all 
tribal governments currently have the institutional capacity to exercise ex-
panded criminal jurisdiction. 173 An opt-in approach would allow Indian na-
tions to exercise expanded criminal jurisdiction as soon as they are ready to 
do so. The recently enacted VA W A is an example of an opt-in approach in 
that it restores inherent tribal authority over a limited set of domestic vio-
lence crimes to participating tribal governments. 174 
The success of any restoration of jurisdiction, including the VA W A 
provisions, will depend in large part on tribal governments receiving ade-
quate funding for their law enforcement and legal systems. Many tribal 
governments rely, at least in part, on federal funding to operate their court 
systems. 175 Tribal leaders, policymakers, and federal government officials 
have long criticized the levels of federal funding to support tribal court sys-
tems as inadequate. 176 To date, no tribal governments are exercising the spe-
cial domestic violence jurisdiction under VA W A, and lack of resources 
remains a barrier to Indian nations wanting to exercise expanded criminal 
jurisdiction. 
This Part endorses the VA W A provisions and agrees that Congress 
should restore criminal authority to Indian nations. Rather than address the 
Over Non-Indians: An Argument for a Statutory Abrogation ofOiiphant, 57 UCLA L. REV. 
553, 574-75 (2009). Other proposals have suggested that tribal governments be able to opt 
out of exercising expanded criminal jurisdiction. See, e.g., Amy Radon, Note, Tribal Juris-
diction and Domestic Violence: The Need for Non-Indian Accountability on the Reservation, 
37 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1275, 1311 (2004) (citing L. Scott Gould, Tough Love for Tribes: 
Rethinking Sovereignty After Atkinson and Hicks, 37 NEW ENG. L. REV. 669, 691 (2003)). 
Even though an opt-out solution may seem more consistent with tribal sovereignty, there are 
distinct long-term advantages to an opt-in solution. With an opt-out solution, some tribal 
governments would most likely have to opt out immediately because they do not have the 
financial resources or institutional capacity to exercise increased criminal jurisdiction. These 
tribal governments may face challenges to regaining this criminal authority later when they 
have the financial resources and institutional capacity to exercise it. In contrast, tribal gov-
ernments may be able to more easily opt in to expanded criminal jurisdiction when they are 
ready to do so. Thanks to Jana Walker for making the advantages of an opt-in over an opt-out 
restoration of tribal criminal jurisdiction clear to me. 
172. FLETCHER, supra note 34, at 8; Hart, supra note 171, at 183-84; Ennis, supra 
note 17l,at574-75. 
173. See, e.g., GAO REPORT ON TLOA, supra note 60, at 2-3 (finding that most tribal 
governments surveyed are not implementing TLOA's enhanced sentencing authority because 
they lack the resources to do so and recommending that the federal government clarify its 
grant programs so it can provide more resources to tribes). 
174. Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, S. 47, I 13th Cong. 
(2013); see supra notes 18-24 and accompanying text. 
175. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GA0-11-252, INDIAN COUNTRY CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE: DEPARTMENTS OF THE INTERIOR AND JUSTICE SHOULD STRENGTHEN COORDINATION 
TO SUPPORT TRIBAL COURTS 21 (20 11 ). 
176. !d.; GAO REPORT ON TLOA, supra note 60, at 2. 
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constitutionality or legality of Congress doing this, I consider the benefits of 
restoring tribal criminal authority from a human rights perspective. Remov-
ing the current limitations on tribal criminal authority may enhance the ac-
countability of both Indian nations and the federal government for human 
rights violations based on private acts of violence in Indian country. 177 In 
Section II.A, I explain how removing federal barriers on tribal criminal au-
thority is consistent with and would bring the United States in compliance 
with international law and Congress's tribal self-determination policy. In 
Section II.B, I demonstrate how restoring tribal criminal authority may en-
courage tribal governments to be more accountable for human rights viola-
tions based on private acts of violence and possibly reduce these human 
rights violations in Indian country in the long term. 
A. Removing Jurisdictional Barriers Ensures U.S. Compliance with Interna-
tional Law and Congress's Self-Determination Policy 
Removing the current barriers on tribal government authority benefits 
the United States government by ensuring the United States' compliance 
with international law and its self-determination policy. Subsection II.A.l 
focuses on how restoring jurisdiction to Indian nations promotes United 
States compliance with international law. Subsection II.A.2 discusses how 
removing restrictions on tribal criminal authority furthers the United States' 
policy of self-determination. 
1. Complying with International Law 
As described in Section I.C, the United States government may not be 
fulfilling its international obligations to respond with due diligence to pri-
vate acts of violence. Increasingly, international human rights bodies have 
focused on structural barriers to the exercise and promotion of individual 
human rights and the need for states to take positive action to ensure and 
respect human rights. 178 This focus implies that the best way for the United 
States to comply with international human rights law is to remedy structural 
barriers undermining human rights protection, including removing the barri-
ers to tribal criminal authority. 179 Thus, what at first blush looks like an in-
I 77. See supra note 162 and accompanying text. 
178. See supra note 147 and accompanying text. 
179. Compliance with international human rights law appears to require the removal 
of these structural barriers. In fact, many Native women's activists have recommended that 
the United States enhance its protection of Native women by removing barriers to tribal 
criminal jurisdiction and strengthening tribal governance. Brief for Indian Law Resource 
Center & Sacred Circle National Resource Center to End Violence Against Native Women 
as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 3-4, Lenahan v. United States, Case 12.626, Inter-
Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No. 80111, OENSer.L.NITI.l42, doc. II (2011). 
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ternational human rights problem in fact requires a domestic legal solution, 
namely that the United States restore jurisdiction to Indian nations. 
The removal of current limitations on Indian nations' authority would 
ensure United States compliance with the collective or group rights of Indi-
an nations recognized by international law. Most importantly, it would pro-
mote the right of self-determination of Indian nations under international 
law. 180 Many of the other proposals to remedy criminal jurisdiction issues in 
Indian country, which focus on increasing federal enforcement, 181 fail to 
recognize the role of indigenous peoples' rights in securing international 
human rights in Indian country. Tribal sovereignty or self-determination is 
key to respecting the rights of Indian individuals. 182 The relationship be-
tween human rights and peoples' rights is particularly important in the case 
of violent crime where the majority of perpetrators are non-Indian and the 
community lacks the tools to protect itself from these violent perpetrators. 
The right of self-determination is a well-established general principle 
of internationallaw. 183 The right of self-determination provides that peoples 
should be able to decide for themselves what country they live in and what 
their government should be. 184 Several key international instruments endorse 
the right of self-determination of peoples, including the United Nations 
Charter, the ICCPR, and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, 
and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). 185 The United Nations Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples reaffirms the right of self-determination for 
indigenous peoples, including Indian nations in the United States, in almost 
identical language to the ICCPR and ICESCR. 186 
180. See infra Subsection II.A.2. 
181. See, e.g., Washburn, supra note 15, at 23. 
182. Anecdotal evidence suggests increasing the presence of federal law enforcement 
and federal prosecutions of Indian country crime will not resolve the epidemic of violent 
crimes on all reservations. Timothy Williams, An Indian Reservation in Crime's Deadly 
Grip, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2012, at AI, available at 
http:/ /www.nytimes.com/20 12/02/03/us/wind-river-indian-reservation-where-brutality-is-
banal.html?_r=O (noting that crime on the Wind River Indian Reservation surged during a 
two-year crime fighting initiative by the federal government). 
183. BROWNLIE, supra note 76, at 580. 
184. !d. 
185. U.N. Charter art. I, para. 2 (stating that countries agree to base their relations on 
"respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples"); id. art. 55; 
ICCPR, supra note 28, art. I; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights art. I, adopted Dec. 16, 1966,993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR]. 
186. U.N. Declaration, supra note 70, art. 3 ("Indigenous peoples have the right to 
self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and 
freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development."); cf ICCPR, supra note 28, 
art. I (stating that "[a]ll peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right 
they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cul-
tural development"); ICESCR, supra note 185, art. I (stating that "[a]ll peoples have the 
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Under international law, states are to respect the self-determination of 
peoples, including peoples within an existing state. 187 Article I of the 
ICCPR specifically obligates state parties, including the United States, to 
recognize the right of self-determination. 188 The Declaration extends this 
expectation to indigenous peoples by recognizing that they have the same 
right of self-determination 189 as other peoples. Thus, the United States 
should respect Indian nations' right of self-determination. 
The content or meaning of the right of self-determination is not well 
defined by international law. 190 In the context of indigenous peoples, the 
content of the right of self-determination may be inferred from the Declara-
tion even though it does not formally define the right of self-
determination. 191 A key aspect of the right of self-determination under the 
Declaration is the right of indigenous peoples to develop, promote, and 
right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status 
and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development"). 
187. U.N. Charter arts. I, 55; Declaration on Principles of International Law Con-
cerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter 
of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, U.N. 
Doc. A/8028, at 121 (Oct. 24, 1970); see also Reference Re Secession of Quebec, [ 1998] 
S.C.R. 217, 285 (Can.). Scholars disagree over whether the right of self-determination is a 
peremptory norm of customary international law. See, e.g., HURST HANNUM, AUTONOMY, 
SOVEREIGNTY, AND SELF-DETERMINATION: THE ACCOMMODATION OF CONFLICTING RIGHTS 
44-45 (1990). 
188. JCCPR, supra note 28, art. I. 
189. U.N. Declaration, supra note 70, art. I ("Indigenous peoples have the right to the 
full enjoyment, as a collective or as individuals, of all human rights and fundamental free-
doms as recognized in the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Hu-
man Rights and international human rights law."); Coulter, supra note 37 (explaining that 
"indigenous peoples, like all peoples, are entitled to self-determination as provided in the 
Covenants"); S. James Anaya, The Right of Indigenous Peoples to Self-Determination in the 
Post-Declaration Era, in MAKING THE DECLARATION WORK: THE UNITED NATIONS 
DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 184, 185 (Claire Charters & Rodolfo 
Stavenhagen eds., 2009). Prior to the adoption of the Declaration, the right of self-
determination in Article I of the ICCPR was not thought to extend to indigenous peoples. 
For a fuller discussion of Article I of the ICCPR, see HANNUM, supra note 187, at 43-44. 
190. One limitation is clear: only in exceptional circumstances does the right of self-
determination include a right to secede from an existing state. See, e.g., Reference Re Seces-
sion of Quebec, [1998] S.C.R. at 284 ("[T]he general state of international law with respect 
to the right to self-determination is that the right operates within the overriding protection 
granted to the territorial integrity of 'parent' states."). 
191. The right of self-determination in the Declaration does not include the right to 
secede from an existing country. The rule of territorial integrity is explicitly stated in the 
Declaration in Article 46. U.N. Declaration, supra note 70, art. 46 ("Nothing in this Declara-
tion may be interpreted as implying for any State, people, group or person any right to en-
gage in any activity or to perform any act contrary to the Charter of the United Nations or 
construed as authorizing or encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, total-
ly or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States."). 
388 Michigan State Law Review 2013:355 
maintain their institutional structures. 192 Without the ability to develop in-
digenous institutional structures, many of the rights recognized in the Decla-
ration, including rights to health and special protections for women and 
children, may be meaningless. For example, Article 22 mandates special 
protections for indigenous elders, women, and children and obligates the 
state to "take measures, in conjunction with indigenous peoples, to ensure 
that indigenous women and children enjoy the full protection and guaran-
tees against all forms of violence and discrimination." 193 As suggested in 
Section II.B, the best way to ensure these rights is through the promotion of 
indigenous legal systems, including their public safety and law enforcement 
systems. The Declaration seems to envision this possibility in Article 34, 
which states, "Indigenous peoples have the right to promote, develop and 
maintain their institutional structures and their distinctive customs, spiritual-
ity, traditions, procedures, practices and, in the cases where they exist, jurid-
ical systems or customs, in accordance with international human rights 
standards." 194 The current enforcement environment in Indian country ap-
pears to undermine the rights in both Articles 22 and 34. Indian women are 
subject to high rates of violence, and at least one empirical study indicates 
that the current enforcement environment in Indian country has retarded 
tribal institutional development when it comes to law enforcement and legal 
systems. 195 Thus, rather than create incentives for Indian nations to take 
human rights seriously and ensure special protections to vulnerable popula-
tions, the enforcement environment has created disincentives to human 
rights accountability in Indian country by limiting the authority and re-
sources available to Indian nations to respond to human rights violations 
based on private acts of violence. 196 
The Declaration is a non-binding instrument, meaning that nation-
states are not legally bound to recognize the rights it affirms and that cur-
rently the United States cannot be held responsible for a violation of it under 
international law. 197 The Declaration is, however, an official statement by 
192. !d. art. 4 ("Indigenous peoples, in exercising their right to self-determination, 
have the right to autonomy or self-government in matters relating to their internal and local 
affairs, as well as ways and means for financing their autonomous functions."); id. art. 5 
("Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain and strengthen their distinct political, legal 
economic, social and cultural institutions, while retaining their right to participate fully, if 
they so choose, in the political, economic, social and cultural life of the State."); id. art. 21, 
para. I. 
193. !d. art. 22. 
194. !d. art. 34. 
195. See Goldberg & Champagne, supra note 16, at 704. 
196. For a fuller discussion on how federal Indian law generally provides Indian 
nations with perverse incentives and undermines tribal government initiatives, see Jacob T. 
Levy, Three Perversities of Indian Law I 0 (Jan. 2007) (unpublished manuscript), available 
at http://works.bepress.com/jacob _levy/!. 
197. See Coulter, supra note 31, at 546. 
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most United Nations member states of the rights of indigenous peoples un-
der international law. 198 As such, it carries tremendous moral and political 
force, "leads to an expectation of maximum compliance by States," and 
serves as a basis for emerging customary law. 199 Some of the standards in 
the Declaration are already state practice, and states, including the United 
States, are increasingly recognizing the right of indigenous peoples to de-
velop their own legal institutions. 200 In its most recent report, the Interna-
tional Law Association Committee on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
concluded and recommended that states "comply-according to customary 
and, where applicable, conventional international law-with the obligation 
to recognize and promote the right of indigenous peoples to autonomy or 
self-government," including "the right ... to establish, maintain and devel-
op their own legal and political institutions."201 The United States should 
comply with the Declaration regardless of whether it is legally obligated to 
because it reaffirms the existing international principle of self-determination 
and reflects the United States' commitment to work with Indian nations on 
the challenges that they face. 202 
Removing the barriers to tribal criminal jurisdiction contributes to the 
implementation of the right of self-determination for Indian nations recog-
nized under international law and the individual human rights of indigenous 
peoples. The Declaration recognizes that the right of self-determination for 
Indian nations is key to ensuring the individual human rights of indigenous 
peoples. The development and maintenance of tribal institutional structures, 
in particular, will help tribal governments to increase public safety and deter 
violence in their communities. 
2. Promoting Tribal Self-Determination 
Removing the barriers to Indian nations' jurisdictional authority pro-
motes and fulfills the United States government's policy of tribal self-
determination. For the past forty years, the United States government's offi-
198. !d. 
199. ILA, supra note 70, at 29. 
200. See Siegtried Wiessner, Indigenous Sovereignty: A Reassessment in Light of the 
UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1141, 
1176 (2008) ("In important respects, particularly regarding their rights to their territories, 
their culture, and internal self-government, the Declaration reaffirms pre-existing rules of 
customary international law and treaty law."). For more information on state practice in this 
area, see Siegfried Wiessner, Rights and Status of Indigenous Peoples: A Global Compara-
tive and International Legal Analysis, 12 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 57 (1999). 
20 I. ILA, supra note 70, at 30. 
202. U.S. STATE DEP'T, ANNOUNCEMENT OF U.S. SUPPORT FOR THE UNITED NATIONS 
DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES: INITIATIVES TO PROMOTE THE 
GOVERNMENT-TO-GOVERNMENT RELATIONSHIP AND IMPROVE THE LIVES OF INDIGENOUS 
PEOPLES (20 I 0), available at http://usun.state.gov/documents/organization/153239.pdf. 
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cial policy towards Indian nations has been one of self-determination. 203 The 
Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975 declared 
this policy, stating, "[T]he United States is committed to supporting and 
assisting Indian tribes in the development of strong and stable tribal gov-
ernments, capable of administering quality programs and developing the 
economies of their respective communities."204 Despite a Supreme Court 
often unwilling to follow the dictates of the policy,205 Congress's tribal self-
determination policy has provided some Indian nations with the opportunity 
to develop effective governing structures, laws, and policies and to foster 
long-term economic development. 206 
Barriers to tribal authority, however, undermine the congressional pol-
icy of tribal self-determination. 207 While Congress has attempted to address 
the self-determination deficit in other areas, it has lagged behind in moving 
to restore jurisdictional authority to Indian nations.208 Thus, despite its poli-
cy of self-determination, Congress has rarely reconsidered or amended, and 
never repealed, any of the federal statutes limiting tribal criminal jurisdic-
tion and undermining tribal self-determination. Professor Washburn argues 
that Congress's failure to implement its self-determination policy in terms 
of criminal jurisdiction is particularly problematic because "[ c ]riminal law 
is the formal institution in which a community articulates and codifies its 
most sacrosanct values."209 He continues, "To have true self-determination, 
a community must be able to define its own moral code through its criminal 
laws and articulate a process for enforcing them."210 
203. Levy, supra note 196, at 10. 
204. 25 U.S.C. § 450a (2006). 
205. For example, the Supreme Court decided Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 
stripping Indian nations of their inherent authority to prosecute non-Indian offenders a mere 
three years after Congress passed the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance 
Act. 435 U.S. 191, 195 (1978). 
206. Joseph Kalt, Constitutional Rule and the Effective Governance of Native Na-
tions, in AMERICAN INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM AND THE REBUILDING OF NATIVE 
NATIONS 184, 184 (Eric D. Lemont ed., 2006) ("At the same time, the evidence is over-
whelming that political self-rule is the only policy that has enabled at least some tribes to 
break out of a twentieth-century history of federal government-dominated decision making 
that yielded social, cultural, and economic destruction."); Stephen Cornell & Joseph P. Kalt, 
Two Approaches to the Development of Native Nations: One Works, the Other Doesn't, in 
REBUILDING NATIVE NATIONS: STRATEGIES FOR GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT 3, 7 (Miri-
am Jorgensen ed., 2007). 
207. See Levy, supra note 196, at I 0. 
208. Washburn, supra note 15, at 22 (arguing that Congress has sought to increase 
tribal self-determination in health care, education, land management, and environmental 
protection, but not criminal jurisdiction). 
209. !d. 
210. !d. at 23; see also Kalt, supra note 206, at 208 ("Arguably, no dimension of self-
government embodies political sovereignty more than a community's running of its own law 
enforcement and court system. For it is in such conduct, with its potential and (if need be) 
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Further, implementation of the tribal self-determination policy, includ-
ing restoring jurisdiction to Indian nations, when accompanied by resources 
to support it, has proven workable. 211 Empirical studies have demonstrated 
that self-determination is the most effective policy for tribal governments 
because tribal governments are most successful when they are given the 
opportunity to make their own decisions and have the resources to imple-
ment those decisions. 212 Under current federal law, Indian nations have not 
had an opportunity to choose how they respond to human rights violations 
based on private acts of violence because the United States has unilaterally 
decided for them by restricting their criminal authority. 
B. Restoring Tribal Jurisdiction Promotes Tribal Human Rights Accounta-
bility 
While compliance with international law and federal policy are lauda-
tory goals, removing barriers to tribal criminal jurisdiction may increase the 
human rights accountability of Indian nations and decrease human rights 
violations based on private acts of violence in Indian country in the long 
term. First, restoring jurisdictional authority to Indian nations will improve 
human rights accountability because it will allow Indian nations to develop 
culturally appropriate responses to human rights abuses based on private 
violence occurring within their communities. Some evidence suggests that 
to the extent possible, some Indian nations are already trying to do this. 213 
Second, restoring jurisdictional authority may increase human rights ac-
countability because it empowers Indian communities to hold their govern-
ments accountable for human rights violations. 
1. Increasing Human Rights Defenders 
Removing the barriers to tribal authority will increase tribal human 
rights accountability because Indian nations will have the opportunity to 
respond to violence-based human rights abuses within their communities. 214 
actual use of coercive force, that a community's institutions of self-determination most stark-
ly cross over from civic organization to government."). 
211. Stephen Cornell, Catherine Curtis & Miriam Jorgensen, The Concept of Govern-
ance and Its Implications for First Nations 24-25 (Joint Occasional Papers on Native Affairs, 
Paper No. 2004-02, 2004). 
212. Kalt & Singer, supra note 166, at I ("Supported by every U.S. President since 
the 1960s and bolstered, for a time, by a combination of federal court rulings and congres-
sional policies, tribal self-rule-sovereignty-has proven to be the only policy that has 
shown concrete success in breaking debilitating economic dependence on federal spending 
programs and replenishing the social and cultural fabric that can support vibrant and healthy 
communities and families."). 
213. See infra Subsection II.B.I. 
214. Cornell, Curtis & Jorgensen, supra note 211, at 14. 
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Under the current enforcement environment, the hands of Indian nations are 
often tied, with few, if any, options available to them for responding effec-
tively to violence-based human rights abuses. 215 As a result, many Indian 
nations feel that they cannot effectively protect their women and children, 
much less other citizens and residents, from violence-based human rights 
abuses. Indian nations cannot develop accountability for human rights un-
less and until they have jurisdiction over private acts of violence and an 
opportunity to decide for themselves how they want to address such prob-
lems. 
Admittedly, there is no guarantee that Indian nations will do a better 
job of respecting individuals and ensuring their protection from human 
rights violations based on private acts of violence than the federal govern-
ment currently does. In fact, the National Association of Criminal Defense 
Lawyers and the National Association of Federal Defenders, among others, 
allege that restoring criminal jurisdiction to tribal courts over non-Indians 
would deprive non-Indian defendants of basic constitutional rights with no 
effective remedy. 216 Clearly, tribal governments and tribal courts should 
respect and protect the rights of everyone-victims and criminal defendants 
alike. To some extent, 
The Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA) already requires tribal governments to provide 
all rights accorded to defendants in state and federal court, including core rights 
such as the Fourth Amendment right to be secure from unreasonable searches and 
seizures, and the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. There is no 
question that federal courts have authority to review tribal court decisions which 
result in incarceration, and they have the authority to review whether a defendant 
has been accorded the rights required by ICRA. 217 
Further, most, if not all, proposals to restore criminal jurisdiction to 
Indian nations require them to provide defendants with the same constitu-
tional protections that the criminally accused receive in state and federal 
courts. 218 Admittedly, some tribes may need to increase their protections for 
215. See supra Section I. C. 
216. See Criminal Defense Letter, supra note 22. A related concern is the complaint 
that most Indian nations do not provide public defenders. /d. at 4. Recent amendments to 
ICRA, however, require Indian nations to provide public defenders to accused individuals 
facing sentences of more than one year in prison. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(c)(l) (2006). Most, if not 
all, proposals to restore criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians to Indian nations have also 
included this condition, and it is unlikely that Congress would pass legislation not including 
such protection for the accused. Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, S. 
47, !13th Cong. (2013). Additionally, future legislation or Indian nations on their own could 
adopt one of the recent proposals for the creation of an intertribal body to ensure external 
accountability of tribal courts. 
217. Law Professors Letter, supra note 36, at 5 (internal citations omitted). 
218. In fact, the Tribal Law and Order Act required Indian nations to provide criminal 
defendants with more protections than state courts by requiring law-trained judges. Indian 
Arts and Crafts Amendments Act of2010, Pub. L. No. 111-211, 124 Stat. 2258 (2010). 
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the rights of defendants in tribal court. 219 Other Indian nations, however, 
already provide more stringent protections for defendants than are required 
by state or federal law. 220 
The fact that some tribes may do a worse job221-just as some states 
do a worse job than others at ensuring, respecting, and protecting human 
rights-should not lead to the rejection of proposals for restoring jurisdic-
tion to Indian nations. Rather than preventing all tribes from exercising ju-
risdiction because of fears of how some may treat criminal defendants, ef-
forts should focus on empowering Indian nations to acquire more jurisdic-
tion as they are ready by providing opt-in provisions, improving tribal gov-
ernments throughout the country, and allocating financial and other re-
sources to tribal governments so that they can respect and ensure the human 
rights of everyone in their communities. 
The advantage of a restoration of jurisdiction is that it allows tribal 
governments that want to act as human rights defenders to do so rather than 
preventing them from doing so. Some Indian nations have demonstrated 
considerable concern for the human rights of the people residing within 
their territories, and a few have even adopted international human rights 
standards for protecting those rights. 222 For instance, in 2006, the Navajo 
Nation created the Navajo Nation Human Rights Commission to hear 
claims of human rights violations brought by its citizens. 223 But even when 
they demonstrate the desire to address human rights violations, Indian na-
tions are limited in their ability to do so, especially when it comes to human 
rights violations based on private acts of violence occurring within their 
territories, because of the federal restrictions on their criminal authority. 
Once their authority is recognized, Indian nations may prove more re-
sponsive to human rights issues than the federal government. While general-
izations are difficult, if not impossible, to make about 566 Indian and Alas-
219. Criminal Defense Letter, supra note 22, at 4. 
220. See, e.g., Navajo Nation v. Rodriguez, 8 Navajo Rptr. 604, 'If 10 (Navajo 2004) 
(requiring law enforcement to give Miranda warnings in English and Navajo). See generally 
CARRIE E. GARROW & SARAH DEER, TRIBAL CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 201-341 (2004). 
221. See, e.g., Angela R. Riley, (Tribal) Sovereignty and Illiberalism, 95 CALIF. L. 
REV. 799 (2007) (discussing how some tribal governments have illiberal tendencies); Singe!, 
supra note 24, at 586-87 (explaining that some Indian tribes refuse to waive tribal sovereign 
immunity and be accountable for human rights violations). 
222. Mark D. Rosen, Evaluating Tribal Courts' Interpretations of the Indian Civil 
Rights Act, in THE INDIAN CIVIL RIGHTS ACT AT FORTY 323 (Kristen A. Carpenter, Matthew 
L.M. Fletcher & Angela R. Riley eds., 2012) (finding that leaving ICRA enforcement to 
tribal courts has not led to significant under-enforcement of individual rights). See generally 
Bethany R. Berger, Justice and the Outsider: Jurisdiction over Nonmembers in Tribal Legal 
Systems, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1047 (2005); Nell Jessup Newton, Tribal Court Praxis: One Year 
in the Life of Twenty Indian Tribal Courts, 22 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 285 (1997). 
223. NAVAJO NATION HUMAN RIGHTS COMM'N, FAQs, http://www.nnhrc.navajo-
nsn.gov/faqs.html (last visited July 15, 2013). 
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ka Native nations, there is no reason to think that respecting and protecting 
human rights is inconsistent with their core values. 224 Some Indian nations 
have incorporated their traditional views of human dignity, and particularly 
respect for women, into their tribal codes and jurisprudence.225 In some cas-
es, Indian nations provide more protections for the accused226 and more re-
spect for the rights of women than state and federal courts do. 227 For exam-
ple, in Winnebago Tribe of Nebraska v. Bigfire, the Winnebago Supreme 
Court relied on tribal teachings and views on gender relations to apply a 
higher standard, strict scrutiny, to a claim of gender discrimination than 
federal courts would. 228 
Despite the current limitations on their authority, many Indian nations 
are already trying to address human rights violations based on private vio-
lence in their communities. Indian nations have used civil jurisdiction over 
Indians and non-Indians to offset their inability to address human rights 
violations based on private acts of violence criminally. 229 Some Indian na-
tions have decriminalized their laws so they can charge non-Indians with 
civil infractions. Tribal courts have entered civil protection orders against 
Indian and non-Indians to prevent further violence/30 occasionally excluded 
violent perpetrators from tribal lands,231 or pursued other civil remedies. 
224. Many Indian cultures have traditionally respected human dignity. See, e.g., 
Carole E. Goldberg, Individual Rights and Tribal Revitalization, 35 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 889, 911-
15 (2003). Some Indian nations, including the Cherokee, historically dealt with issues like 
domestic violence through their clan systems. Jacqueline Agtuca, Beloved Women: Life 
Givers, Caretakers, Teachers of Future Generations, in SHARING OUR STORIES OF SURVIVAL: 
NATIVE WOMEN SURVIVING VIOLENCE 3, 10-12 (Sarah Deer et al. eds., 2008). Under the 
traditional Cherokee clan system, the husband married into and lived with the woman's 
family so her extended family assisted in ensuring that she was not mistreated by him. !d. at 
12. A woman also had the power to terminate the marriage by putting the man's belongings 
outside of her longhouse. For a fuller discussion of how Indian nations traditionally dealt 
with issues of violence against women, see generally id. 
225. Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Indian Courts and Fundamental Fairness: Indian 
Courts and the Future Revisited 22 (Michigan State Univ. Coli. of Law Legal Studies Re-
search Paper Series, Research Paper No. 10-15, 2012), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2079757 (explaining how the Nottawaseppi Huron Band of Pota-
watomi Indians has adopted Anishinaabe customs and traditions as a basis for guaranteeing 
fundamental fairness in reviewing government action). 
226. See, e.g., Navajo Nation v. Rodriguez, 8 Navajo Rptr. 604 (Navajo 2004) (re-
quiring law enforcement to give Miranda warnings in English and Navajo). 
227. Winnebago Tribe of Nebraska v. Bigfire, 25 Ind. L. Rep. 6229 (Winnebago 
1998). 
228. /d. 
229. See generally Hallie Bongar White, Kelly Gaines Stoner & Hon. James G. 
White, 2008 FINAL REPORT: CREATIVE CIVIL REMEDIES AGAINST NON-INDIAN OFFENDERS IN 
INDIAN COUNTRY (2008), available at http://www.ovw.usdoj.gov/docs/civil-remedies.pd( 
230. HARPER & ENTREKIN, supra note 135, at 16. 
231. See, e.g., Mille Lacs Band Banishes Four over Violence, INDIANZ.COM (Oct. 6, 
2008), http://www.indianz.com/News/2008/011208.asp. 
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Some tribes, like the Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians, have developed 
innovative programs to combat domestic and sexual violence. The Missis-
sippi Choctaw's Family Violence and Victim's Services Program uses "sev-
eral complementary strategies to combat domestic violence and its after-
math."232 In addition to revising the Tribe's penal code and raising commu-
nity awareness, the Program facilitates interagency cooperation to ensure 
that the victims' physical, emotional, and legal needs are met. 233 
The few existing empirical studies of tribal law enforcement and tribal 
courts also suggest that many Indian nations already try to respect human 
rights and human dignity. These studies demonstrate that self-rule improves 
service delivery and accountability by suggesting that Indian nations pro-
vide better services when they have an opportunity to do so. 234 Kalt and 
Singer report, 
As in economic performance and the delivery of other governmental services, trib-
al assumption of policing and law enforcement activities under contracting ... with 
the federal government for what would otherwise be federal responsibilities ap-
pears to improve both the objective performance of policing on reservations and 
the subjective attitudes of reservation [residents] toward police activities. 235 
Similarly, in their study on law enforcement in Indian country, Gold-
berg and Champagne found that reservation residents "tend to believe that 
tribal police are much more available than state, country, [or] federal po-
lice."236 Reservation residents also indicated that tribal police respond in a 
timely fashion more often237 and investigate crimes as thoroughly or more 
thoroughly than state, federal, and county police. 238 Further, according to 
reservation residents, tribal police were not more likely to overstep their 
authority than federal, county, or state police. 239 Some scholars attribute this 
improved accountability for law enforcement to the benefits of local tribal 
control. 240 
232. THE HARVARD PROJECT ON AMERICAN INDIAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, 
HONORING NATIONS: 2003 HONOREE: FAMILY VIOLENCE & VICTIM'S SERVICES, MISSISSIPPI 
BAND OF CHOCTAW INDIANS 2, available at 
http://hpaied.org/images/resources/publibrary/Family"/o20Violence%20and%20Victims%20 
Services. pdf. 
233. !d. 
234. Kalt & Singer, supra note 166, at 31. 
235. !d. 
236. Goldberg & Champagne, supra note 16, at 711. 
237. /d. at 713. 
238. /d. at 717. 
239. See id. at 718. In fact, Public Law 280 reservation residents indicated that state 
police were the most likely to overstep their authority. !d. 
240. Kalt & Singer, supra note 166, at 31 ("At the Gila River Indian Community, for 
example, tribal control since 1998 is serving a fast-growing reservation population of 17,000 
on the south side of the Phoenix metropolitan area. By supplementing the funds otherwise 
spent by the federal government with tribal funds, Gila River Police Department has been 
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Existing studies of tribal courts also demonstrate that many tribal 
courts are trying to ensure and respect human rights. Some tribal courts 
even "guarantee fundamental fairness to tribal court litigants beyond the 
minimum standards of the Indian Civil Rights Act."241 In his comprehensive 
study of ICRA implementation by tribal courts, Professor Rosen concluded 
that leaving ICRA enforcement to tribal courts has not led to significant 
under-enforcement of individual rights. 242 Another study, which examined 
one year's reported tribal court decisions, found that non-Indian parties 
were treated fairly. 243 Similarly, Professor Berger's study of Navajo courts 
demonstrated that Navajo appellate courts are evenly balanced for and 
against non-Indian defendants. 244 Additionally, a recent study indicates that 
reservation residents perceive tribal courts to treat Indians and non-Indians 
the same. 245 
Allowing tribal governments the authority to address human rights is-
sues will empower them to respond to these issues more fully and in cultur-
ally appropriate ways. By culturally appropriate ways, I mean that Indian 
nations will have the ability to draw from their own sources of human rights 
law to protect and defend human rights in accordance with international 
law. 246 Indian nations may be more likely to respect and ensure human 
able to significantly expand its staff size, improve conventional police and ranger services, 
and enhance management information capacities. Through a focus on community policing, it 
also has developed neighborhood block watch programs, a Citizens Policy Academy, and a 
bicycle patroVpolice cadets unit. As a result of these efforts, the Department has sharply 
improved response time and decreased crime (while the rates for similar crimes have risen in 
neighboring Phoenix)."). 
241. Fletcher, supra note 225, at 3. 
242. Rosen, supra note 222, at 323. Other studies suggest that tribal courts do not 
deviate substantially from federal and state law in interpreting the due process and equal 
protection clauses in ICRA. See, e.g., Newton, supra note 222, at 323; Fletcher, supra note 
225, at 3. 
243. Newton, supra note 222, at 352. 
244. Berger, supra note 222, at 1074-79. 
245. CAROLE GOLDBERG, DUANE CHAMPAGNE & HEATHER VALDEZ SINGLETON, FINAL 
REPORT: LAW ENFORCEMENT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE UNDER PUBLIC LAW 280, at 189 (2007). 
In contrast, "[t]he reservation-resident respondents generally say that tribal defendants or 
victims are treated less fairly than non-Indians in state or county courts." !d. at 187. Similar-
ly, "[r]eservation residents in non-Public Law 280 jurisdictions say that federal court judges 
and juries are significantly biased in treating Indian cases, while Indian cases are treated 
more fairly in tribal courts." !d. at 190. 
246. I am not advocating for cultural relativism here or defending the right of Indian 
nations to act illiberally. International law allows for culturally influenced implementation of 
universal human rights. STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 24, at 517. The Declaration also 
suggests that Indian nations can promote and develop institutions in accordance with their 
distinctive traditions and customs and international human rights law. U.N. Declaration, 
supra note 70, art. 34. Indian nations have their own sources and traditions of human rights 
and may benefit from using their cultural traditions to implement universally recognized 
human rights. For a fuller discussion of how Indian nations have their own sources and tradi-
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rights because they will be able to tailor their responses to violence to the 
values and traditions of their communities. Studies of good governance sug-
gest that tribal governments are more accountable when they have culturally 
appropriate rules and institutions. 247 Further, some Indian nations have had 
tremendous success in implementing culturally appropriate policies and 
programs. For example, the Tulalip Tribes greatly reduced recidivism rates 
on the reservation within three years of implementing an Alternative Sen-
tencing Program based on their traditional values. 248 Similarly, by taking 
responsibility for law enforcement in its community through § 638 com-
pacting, the Gila River Indian Community improved response times and 
tailored services to better meet its community's needs. 249 Restoring jurisdic-
tion to Indian nations will allow them to choose culturally appropriate ways 
to ensure and respect human rights rather than have federal law imposed 
upon them. 250 While some Indian nations, like the Navajo Nation, may 
choose to create a Human Rights Commission to address alleged violations 
of human rights, 251 others may use Western-style courts or traditional meth-
ods of dispute resolution or adopt international human rights standards. 252 
tions of human rights, see John Borrows, Robina Chair in Law, Pub. Policy & Soc'y, Univ. 
of Minn. Law Sch., Negotiating an Intertribal Human Rights Treaty: Lessons from Indige-
nous Law, Presentation at the Michigan State Law Review Symposium: Indian Tribes and 
Human Rights Accountability (Oct. 4, 2012). 
247. Cornell, Curtis & Jorgensen, supra note 211, at 19 ("[A]s Harvard Project re-
search shows, governing institutions must be viewed as legitimate by the First Nation's citi-
zens if they are to be effective. This means institutions have to match citizens' ideas of how 
authority should be organized and exercised; otherwise, citizens are unlikely to view the 
institutions as their own and are unlikely to support them."). 
248. THE HARVARD PROJECT ON AMERICAN INDIAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, 
HONORING NATIONS: 2006 HONOREE: TULALIP ALTERNATIVE SENTENCING PROGRAM, TULALIP 
TRIBES 3, available at 
http://hpaied.org/images/resources/publibrary/Tulalip%20Alternative%20Sentencing%20Pro 
gram. pdf (noting that "25% of the participants in the Program do notre-offend, as compared 
to only 7-9% in the county"). 
249. THE HARVARD PROJECT ON AMERICAN INDIAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, 
HONORING NATIONS: 2003 HONOREE: ASSURING SELF DETERMINATION THROUGH AN 
EFFECTIVE LAW ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM, GILA RIVER POLICE DEPARTMENT, GILA RIVER 
INDIAN COMMUNITY 2-3, available at 
http:/ /hpaied.org/images/resources/publibrary/ Assuring%20Self'lo20 Determination%20throu 
gh%20an%20Effective%20Law%20Enforcement%20Program.pdf. 
250. Cornell, Curtis & Jorgensen, supra note 211, at 10 ("[J]urisdiction alone is not 
enough. Successful societies also require effective and culturally appropriate rules that make 
it possible to get things done and at the same time protect those societies-and others-from 
the misuse of power."). 
251. NAVAJO NATION HUMAN RIGHTS COMM'N, supra note 223. 
252. My focus here is less on how Indian nations choose to ensure, respect, and pro-
tect human rights than about them having the ability to do so. 
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2. Improving Democratic Accountability for Human Rights 
Restoring criminal jurisdiction to Indian nations will make them di-
rectly accountable to their communities for failures to ensure human rights. 
Under the current enforcement environment, tribal officials can rarely pre-
vent, investigate, and punish human rights violations based on private acts 
of violence because they are so limited in their ability to do so. 253 The limits 
on their authority allow them to blame the federal government rather than 
take responsibility themselves. 254 Removing federal barriers to tribal juris-
diction makes tribal officials more accountable because they will not be able 
to blame the federal government for their own failures to act. 
Restoring jurisdiction may increase tribal accountability for human 
rights because "[s]elf-governance marries decisions and their consequenc-
es."255 Self-governance enhances tribal accountability because as the deci-
sion makers, Indian nations "bear the costs of their own mistakes, and they 
reap the benefits of their own successes."256 Tribal governments should be 
more accountable to the people than state and federal governments because 
they are more susceptible to community pressure. Consider, for example, 
the rationale behind having local officials serve as prosecutors in most 
communities in the United States, namely that the advantage of a local pros-
ecutor is that she will act "with [the] community values in mind" because 
she is accountable to the community directly through elections and indirect-
ly through media attention and popular attention. 257 This rationale currently 
breaks down in Indian country where federal prosecutors prosecute the few 
violent crimes that are prosecuted. Unlike local prosecutors, most federal 
prosecutors do not represent the Indian communities they serve. 258 As out-
siders appointed by the federal government rather than elected by the local 
people, federal Indian country prosecutors are less likely to feel any pres-
253. See supra Section I. C. 
254. Washburn, supra note 12, at 740 ("The existence of exclusively federal jurisdic-
tion for felonies in Indian country shifts the apparent responsibility to maintain institutions 
that help to provide safe reservation environments away from local tribal officials and toward 
federal officials. The tribal leaders who have been rendered impotent by the scheme theoreti-
cally can criticize and blame the federal prosecutors but must shoulder little of the blame or 
accountability for the problem."). 
255. Cornell & Kalt, supra note 206, at 13. 
256. !d. at 14. 
257. Washburn, supra note 12, at 728. 
258. /d. at 729 ("Unlike the usual circumstances, in which the prosecutor internalizes 
and acts in accordance with the mores and values of the community (of which she theoreti-
cally is a part), a federal prosecutor in Indian country may live hundreds of miles from the 
reservation and may not even speak the language used in that community. She may not be 
able to understand and internalize the values of the community that she theoretically pro-
tects."). 
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sure to be accountable to the community. 259 Professor Washburn summariz-
es the accountability problem: "If an Indian community does not like the 
way its offenses are being prosecuted, what action can it take? It can vote 
for a different president in the next quadrennial election and hope that the 
new president will have a policy more in line with the community's de-
sires."260 Similar accountability problems can arise with federal law en-
forcement in Indian country. 261 
Restoring jurisdiction to Indian nations could increase human rights 
accountability by allowing tribal governments to investigate and prosecute 
violent crimes. Tribal governmental control over prosecutors and law en-
forcement would reduce some of the existing accountability problems. The 
tribal community would have more tools for encouraging them to ensure 
and respect human rights. 262 Community members could use community 
pressure, elections, and other mechanisms to voice their frustration if offi-
cials are not acting according to their wishes. For example, most tribal gov-
ernments are elected and the tribal community could hold its tribal govern-
ment responsible for failures to respect and ensure human rights through 
elections. Depending upon the prosecutorial system enacted by the tribe, the 
tribal community may even be able to hold the prosecutor directly responsi-
ble through elections. Under the current enforcement environment, this is 
hardly possible as most of the officials responsible for responding to human 
rights violations based on private acts of violence in Indian country are fed-
eral or state officials. Removing the barriers to tribal authority would in-
crease accountability because the community would have more options for 
holding tribal officials responsible for human rights violations based on 
private violence. 
259. !d. at 731. In fact, the single greatest complaint about federal prosecutors in 
Indian country has been their under-prosecution of crimes. !d. at 733 ("United States Attor-
neys have been widely criticized for decades for failing to give proper attention to Indian 
country cases. The substance of such complaints almost always involves the failure to prose-
cute aggressively enough and almost never involves complaints of 'over-prosecution.'"). 
260. Washburn, supra note 15, at 18. When educating tribal communities about crim-
inal jurisdiction issues, I used to tell them to call their Congressman and Senators to com-
plain about issues that they had with federal law enforcement and U.S. Attorneys. Admitted-
ly, this is probably not much more effective than Professor Washburn's recommendation. 
261. Washburn, supra note 12, at 734 ("Indeed, lack of accountability by federal law 
enforcement has been identified as a chief problem for effective policing in Indian coun-
try."). Some scholars have also suggested that law enforcement officers, who are seen as 
outsiders in a community, have a harder time gaining the community's trust and encouraging 
crime reporting. See, e.g., John Paul Stevens, Our "Broken System" of Criminal Justice, THE 
N.Y. REVIEW OF BOOKS (Nov. 10, 2011), available at 
http:/ /www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/20 I I /nov/1 0/our -broken-system-criminal-justice 
(reviewing WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE (20 11 )). 
262. Washburn, supra note 15, at 17-18 (noting the need for greater democratic ac-
countability when it comes to justice in Indian country because "the officials involved there 
are the least accountable officials in the United States"). 
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Restoring jurisdiction to Indian nations may also improve tribal ac-
countability for human rights by increasing community involvement in re-
specting and ensuring human rights. A key aspect of increasing community 
investment in human rights implementation is ensuring that the community 
is engaged with these issues. Under the current enforcement environment, 
Indian communities are precluded from such involvement because they are 
not part of the criminal justice process. As Professor Washburn explains, 
criminal justice in Indian country "is not a process that happens 'of the peo-
ple, for the people, or by the people.' It happens 'to the people' through an 
external process run by outsiders."263 The result of this external process is 
that the community often remains outside the criminal justice process. Trib-
al law enforcement and attorneys are not involved in the investigation and 
prosecution of crimes. Further, due to the geographical distance between 
reservation communities and federal courthouses, the members of the Indian 
community rarely serve on juries in Indian country criminal cases or even 
learn how cases were resolved. 264 The disconnect between the community 
and the administration of justice prevents the community from serving a 
watchdog role and insisting that human rights be respected. If community 
members were informed as to the criminal process and could be involved in 
it (such as through jury service), they would be more invested in its out-
comes and in ensuring that its values were represented in the administration 
of justice. Local tribal control of the criminal justice system would enhance 
the opportunity for the community to be involved in the criminal justice 
system because trials would take place in the community. Community 
members would become more invested in the system and its ability to en-
sure and respect human rights. 
Indian nations may, and probably will, make mistakes as they gain ac-
countability for human rights. Indian nations will also learn from their mis-
takes, if only because the community will hold them accountable for them 
either electorally or through community pressure. Over time, this leads to 
better tribal decision making and increased accountability. 265 In fact, empiri-
cal studies on tribal self-governance find that, "[i]n general, Indian nations 
are better decision makers about their own affairs, resources, and futures 
because they have the largest stake in the outcomes."266 These findings seem 
263. !d. at 14. 
264. !d. ("These cases happen a hundred or more miles away from the communities 
where the offenses occurred. And these cases often get little or no publicity on the reserva-
tion. By and large, the press is absent. And many people in the community have no idea what 
is happening in these cases."). 
265. Cornell & Kalt, supra note 206, at 14 ("As a result, over time and allowing for a 
learning curve, the quality of their decisions improves."). 
266. !d. ("There are concrete, bottom-line payoffs to tribal self-rule. For example, a 
Harvard Project study of 75 tribes with significant timber resources found that, for every 
timber-related job that moved from BIA forestry to tribal forestry-that is, for every job that 
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to suggest that tribal sovereignty is key to respecting the human rights of 
Indian individuals and other individuals within Indian country. They also 
seem to imply that it is reasonable to expect that tribal accountability for 
human rights will increase once Indian nations can actually respond to hu-
man rights abuses based on private acts of violence within Indian country. 
CONCLUSION 
Federal law is a serious impediment to ensuring both individual and 
collective human rights in Indian country. It creates an environment where 
the perpetrators of human rights violations based on private violence and the 
governments responsible for preventing them appear to be beyond account-
ability. The federal government is largely unresponsive (despite unilaterally 
claiming the sometimes exclusive authority to respond to violent crimes in 
Indian country), and federal law strips Indian nations of most of their au-
thority to respond to human rights violations based on private acts of vio-
lence within their territories. The result is the systematic non-enforcement 
of criminal laws in Indian country by the federal and state governments 
having the authority to do so. 
One solution may greatly enhance human rights accountability in In-
dian country: the federal government could remove some, if not all, of the 
barriers preventing Indian nations from acting with due diligence to prevent, 
investigate, and punish human rights violations based on private acts of 
violence in Indian country. This solution, partially adopted by VA W A 2013, 
respects the right of self-determination of Indian nations and promotes indi-
vidual human rights in Indian country by recognizing that the exercise of 
tribal self-determination is key to the protection of individual human rights. 
It will empower many Indian nations to better ensure and respect individual 
human rights in Indian country. Restoring criminal jurisdiction to Indian 
nations will not ensure the protection of all human rights in all instances, 
but it will provide Indian nations with the opportunity to respond to some of 
the worst human rights abuses. Studies have shown that once given the op-
portunity and the resources, Indian nations often prove competent in provid-
ing services to their communities. Indian nations should be given the chance 
to prove that they can also prevent human rights abuses based on private 
acts of violence within their territories. 
moved from federal control to tribal control-prices received and productivity in the tribe's 
timber operations rose. On average, tribes do a better job of managing their forests because 
these are their forests."). 

